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PREFACE
At the time that the topic of this thesis was conceived, the 
author felt very deeply that in order to deal effectively with the 
Soviets in foreign affairs, one must understand the enigmatic repre­
sentatives and leaders from the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics, 
those politicians whose words and actions are often such a mystery to 
the Western world, yet could have a very large impact upon it.
Little did the author realize that the completion of this
thesis would coincide with the trials of Soviet dissidents Anatoly
Shchararansky, Alexander Ginsburg, and Viktoras I^atkus. For those
whose anger and disbelief join with many against such trials, this
thesis should be able to help explain the predicament of the politi-
cj.ans of the Soviet Union and contribute an understanding of why the
*
leaders must carry on such farces of justice. That against the Human 
Rights statutes of the Helsinki Accords, the pressure the United States 
has applied for Soviet human rights, and the constant declaration of 
democracy in the Soviet state, trials, such as the ones mentioned, were 
the only recourse for these men to retain their dignity.
*
Hedrick Smith, in his book The Russians supports this statement 
on page ”. . . More startling, I knew of famous Soviet writers who
have the banned, works of Solzhenitsyn and other literary contraband quite 
openly on their bookshelves, a sin for which dissidents have been jailed. 
But, establishment status provided them protection.”
vii
It’s sad to think that men must play with other men’s lives in 
order to raise their stature in their own eyes.
This research attempts to provide a basis for a thorough 
understanding of these complex politicians and a glimpse at the 
environment in which they must function.
The Author
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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and writing of this manuscript.
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ABSTRACT
WHO IS THE SOVIET POLITICIAN?
The purpose of this research is to create a complete, realistic 
picture of the members of the All Union Soviet political elite. This 
is accomplished by analyzing, statistically and narratively, the 
memberships of the All Union political organizations, both in the 
Communist Party and state hierarchies.
The elite were separated into three strata, correlating for 
the most part with the level of the organization in which they held 
membership. The exceptions were members of the upper or top Party elite 
who held membership in most or all bodies discussed. One chapter de­
viates from the others by narratively analyzing the motives and tactics 
of these politicians, including a discussion of the political environment 
in which they must function. This study endeavors to generate a thorough 
understanding of this complex group.
The Soviet politician is an educated, middle-aged male, holding 
a professional position in the state or Party hierarchy, of the Slavic 
nationality and very adept at political maneuvering and tactics. He is 
also an individual trying to maintain some harmony between the conflicting 
natures of his private and public lives; between being a member of a 
very privileged class,-while professing to live in a ’classless society; 
and between seeing the faults of the Communist society, yet always speak­
ing of the emergence of the ’New Soviet Man.’ He is one who is motivated 
more by ambition and material success than by Marxist-Leninist ideology.
WHO IS THE SOVIET POLITICIAN?
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL
Most of the scholarly work or published books available in the 
field of Soviet politics are devoted to a general survey of the Soviet 
political system, a general analysis of top party or government leader­
ship, the role and influence of groups in Soviet politics, biographies 
of political leaders, and the relation of personal experiences under 
the Soviet regime.'*' Acknowledging the importance of these contributions 
to this field of study, one area seems to lack concise, comprehensible 
coverage, the Soviet political elite at the All Union level. The pur­
pose of this thesis will be to generate a thorough understanding of 
this group— to be accomplished through statistical analysis and narra­
tive accounts of the memberships of the various All Union political 
institutions.
This paper will consist of six chapters which will cover all 
the aspects of the All Union political elite. Three of the chapters 
statistically analyze the members of this select group, while one 
deviates from the other methodology by presenting narrative descrip­
tions of the tactics and motives of these individuals. The combining 
of the Communist Party and state institutions within the separate
1
Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan, "The Political Recruitment and 
Carrer Patterns of Obkom First Secretaries from 1952-1969" (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971)i P- !•
chapters was not by arbitrary assignment, but was done because of the 
existence of forms of comparability, structural or otherwise, between 
the institutions.
Definition of Terms
Before continuing with the material of this thesis, definitions 
of terms and several explanations are needed to clarify the contents. 
Though the term elite can vary in its definition from source to source, 
to discuss each would both lengthen this thesis unnecessarily and be 
of no relevance to the purpose of the research. Therefore, in this 
paper "elite" as a noun will refer to individuals belonging to a select 
group of people who assume a disproportionately larger role in society
p
due to their highly responsible positions. Though Milton Lodge, in 
his book, Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin, divides the Soviet elite 
into five separate types— the full-time Party functionaries, the econo­
mic administrators, the military, the literary intelligensia, and the 
3
legal profession — for the purposes of this paper, the elite of Soviet 
society will be divided into only two groups, the intelligensia and the 
political elite. The former achieve their status by the functions they 
perform; among their members are outstanding or highly qualified indivi­
duals engaged in research and academic work, doctors, lawyers, and
4journalists. The latter receive their status from the positions that 
2
Ibid., p. 22. Mervyn Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR: 
Towards a Definition of the Soviet Elite", Survey, Summer, 1975? P* !•
•2
Milton C. Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin (Columbus, 
Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 19 6 9)? p- 1-
if
Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change", Pro­
blems of Communism (December, 1 9 6 6), p. 5 8. Mervyn Matthews, op. cit., 
p. 24.
if
they hold in society; this group includes those individuals involved
in the power structure of the Soviet Union, the government or Communist
c.
Party apparatus, dealing with decision-making and control over people.''
In several instances, the political elite were members of the func-
£
tional group elite before becoming members of the power structure.
The concentration of this research is on the political elite, 
often designated as Soviet politicians in this research, who hold 
membership in the political institutions at the All Union level. For 
the purposes of this paper, the group will be divided into two categor­
ies; the Party elite, those with membership in Party hierarchy organs, 
and the government elite, those with membership in State hierarchy 
organs. In Soviet society, this group as a whole consists of several 
strata, with pay, privilege, status, and power increasing as the level 
of elite increases, as will be further discussed in Chapter V. (The 
members of the top political elite, the men of the Politburo of the 
Communist Party, may also be referred to as the power elite.) Each 
chapter will clarify the level and category of political elite to which 
the memberships discussed belong.
The paper will confine itself to a discussion of the political 
elites at the All Union level. Though information on political elites 
at the republic or lower levels might enhance the applicability of the 
conclusions of this thesis, it would also force this paper to become too
5
Boris Meissner, op. cit., p. 5 8 . Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan, 
op. cit., p. 2 3-
^Michael PI Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central 
Committee: An Elite Analysis," The American Political Science Review
(December, 1968), p. 1232.
long or too involved in detail* Therefore, the research has been 
limited to include only those members of the political institutions at 
the All Union level.
Several terms used extensively in this paper must be defined*
The term social class will refer to a social group in society whose 
members share similar' rank and status. The word professional will be 
defined in. a narrow sense. In the paper, "professional" will designate 
an individual with an advanced degree, who holds a highly responsible 
Party or government position. Another clarification which must be made 
is the distinction between the terms Russian and Soviet as used in 
this research. Russian will denote only a nationality distinction, 
while Soviet designates any representative of the USSR, regardless of 
nationality group. All other terms needing qualification are defined 
at their first introduction in the thesis.
Party-State Parallelism
In order to comprehend the levels and the importance of the two
groups of Soviet political elite, a discussion of the dual hierarchies
in the Soviet system is merited. These two parallel hierarchies are
the Communist Party and the state. The parallelism is illustrated in
Appendix A. The role of the Communist Party as described in the 1977
Constitution is "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the
7
nucleus of its political system." The Party determines the direction 
and policies of the regime, controls the conditions upon which political 
or administrative advancement is achieved, and retains control of the
7
John S. Reshetar, Jr, The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper &
Row, 1978), p. 153-
6government by determining which Party leaders will hold which
8 9government posts. It is also unhampered by the law. On the other
hand, the state is the practical administrator of the political 
system. It manages the economy, enforces the laws, and maintains the 
defense of the country."^ It is the legitimate controller of the coun­
try, but the Party's superiority turns this fact into near fiction. 
Merle Fainsod illustrates this relationship through comments about the 
Supreme Soviet.
In the Supreme Soviet, all important decisions come ready­
made from Party leadership. The task of the Supreme Soviet 
is not to question, but to execute, to cloth the Party 
thesis in a garb of constitutional legality. The result 
minimizes the authority of the whole government apparatus.H
With the existence of these hierarchies in this political
system, conflict and tensions often create strained relations between
.the two. The Party elite desires to control the decision-making in all
areas, especially economic, and have the final say in all appointments
to influential positions; the state seeks the right to run the economy
with minimum interference by Party functionaries and to select person-
12nel without regard to political criteria. Though the state has many
Ibid., pp. 95, 133- 
"Ibid., p. 133*
^G. Moiseyev and A. Ardatovsky, Political Democracy in the 
USSK (London: Soviet Booklets), p. 1.
11Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Euled (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 38^ +.
12Sidney Ploss, "Politics in the Kremlin," Problems of Communism, 
(May-June, 1970), p. 12.
7bodies that fulfill functions not performed by the Party organizations, 
the Party apparatus exercises vast powers and ultimate decision-making 
ability, and dominates the vast governmental structure it originally 
created.
Recruitment
Recruitment is the core of the Soviet political system, for it
determines the members of the political elite. Two methods exemplify
this process: Soviet elections and the nomenklatura-list system. The
unifying force in both instances is the Communist Party, for it exercises
the final approval over all candidates. Within the state hierarchy,
representatives up to and including the deputies of the Supreme Soviet
are directly elected through the Soviet electoral system. The most
misunderstood concept of this system is the Soviet claim that their
elections are democratic. Herbert McCloskey and John Turner discuss
this Soviet assertion in the following words:
The Communist doctrine bases its democratic claims on the 
mystique of the proletariat’s ’historic mission'; since the 
proletariat is ’summoned by history' to fulfill a great 
democratic mission, whatever serves this mission becomes 
democratic by definition. And since the Party directs the 
proletarian dictatorship and decides the nature of the 
mission, anything the Party wills also becomes democratic,
. . .  therefore, the Soviet government can only act in a 
democratic manner because it is controlled by the Party . . .  
since everything Soviet by nature is democratic, the regime 
can legitimately deny that there is any contradiction be­
tween democracy and proletarian dictatorship.V*
^John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 133>
lif
Herbert McClosky and John Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, i9 6 0), p. 297*
8Defining democracy in this way, the Soviet state can be declared a 
democracy and its elections, democratic.
Though Soviet elections are often considered as non-democratic 
by the outside world, they appear to have actual citizen participation.
15
Universal suffrage and the secret ballot have both been adopted.
There is no residency requirement on voting, and nominations for candi­
dates may come from several sources. Elections are even declared to 
have a 97 to 99 percent turnout (refer to Appendix B). However, the 
accuracy of these high percentages comes into question in the following 
example, as related by Robert Kaiser in his book Russia: "a man in
Moscow who once worked in a polling station in the capital said that
the number of non-voting adults in his area was about eleven percent;
l6the Party had ordered in advance what figures should be reported."
Further scrutiny of these democratic characteristics reveals the
existence of only one candidate for each office. John Hazard contends,
While Western peoples do not consider one-party systems 
compatible with the processes of democracy, it must be 
admitted that there are parts of the world that are accepted 
as democratically governed and in which there is only one 
effective party . . . .  It is possible for a system to 
merit attribution of the democratic label if there is only 
one Party, but there must be a choice of candidates within 
the Party. -^7
15
An explanation of the Soviet secret ballot includes this infor­
mation. To vote positively, the Soviet citizen will fold the ballot and 
drop it in the ballot box. To vote negatively, the voter needs to go 
into a private booth and cross out the rejected candidates. To perform 
the latter, it creates an obvious reaction from officials at the polls. 
However, to be subjected to that is usually preferable to the harassment 
one receives if he refuses to vote at all.
1 g
Robert G. Kaiser, Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1976), p- 159*
17John N. Hazard, The Soviet System of Government (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 50.
9In the Soviet Union, this choice does not occur. Even though the term
for elections in the Russian language, vybory, has a literal meaning of
lSchoices, selections, and alternatives, only one to three percent of
the population seem to take this contradiction seriously. These are
the citizens who refuse to vote or vote against the slate of nominees.
Nominations of candidates for the soviets are endorsed by open
meetings of various public and work organizations, but it is no secret
that these nominations are actually decided by the Party nucleus of the
19organization in prior, closed meetings. If the candidate for the
deputy nomination is rejected in these pro forma meetings, which has
20occurred, the Party officials select a replacement. Most of the
population accept the one candidate practice and contend that more than
21one candidate might indicate a lack of confidence in the candidate.
Soviet citizens, on the whole, place their greatest emphasis on material
possessions or aesthetic things in life, being content to leave undisturbed
22the leadership’s actions in the area of politics.
Both Western sources and Soviet writers are in close agreement as
23to the functions of elections in the Soviet Union. The purpose of 
Soviet elections is not to give the citizenry a choice of candidates for
DL0
Jerome M. Gilison, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent", 
American Political Science Review (September, 1968), p. 8lf>.
19Ibid., p. 8 1 7.
2°t^Ibid.
Ibid.
22Dan N. Jacobs, ed., The New Communisms (New York: Harper 8c
Row), p. 125•
23Jerome M. Gilison, op. cit., p. 8l*f.
10
government positions* Rather, they are used as a means of ’democratic* 
approval of the regime’s policies in order to legitimize it in the eyes 
of the world, an educational and propaganda exercise to inform the
2bpeople of the Party’s plans. During the campaigns, past, present, and 
future plans are presented to the populace. If they approve of the 
policies, they will ratify the slate of proposed candidates. If they 
want to express dissatisfaction or actually dislike a candidate, they 
will either vote against a candidate or refuse to vote altogether.
Soviet elections, as they are, have become a symbol of the regime’s legi­
timate position in the world and provide an opportunity for the regime
25to test its motivation powers.
The nomenklatura or list system is the method by which Party or
elite state positions are filled. While the exact details or mechanics
of the system are not a matter of public record, there are certain
aspects which can be mentioned. Each Party organ has a list of Party
or government positions, its nomenklatura, over which it has special
responsibility; the organ then must give its approval before the occu-
26pant of a listed post is removed or another chosen. The more important
the post, the higher the level of Party organ in whose nomenklatura it 
27is placed. The system is hierarchial, as is the Party structure. The 
candidates for nomenklatura posts are chosen from registers of preferred,
2bLeonard Shapiro, The Government and Politics of the Soviet 
Union (New York: Vintage Books, 1967)1 p- 108. ~
25Dan N. Jacobs, op. cit., p. 125.
26Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1 9 6 9), pp. 29, 30, 115, 116.
27Ibid.
11
promising individuals at the corresponding administrative levels.
In the case of choosing the delegates for the Party Congress, as an 
example, the Central Party organs, especially the Party Organs Depart­
ment of the Central Committee, subject to careful screening the candi­
dates selected by regional bodies for election to the Congress, and in
29effect, can exercise a veto power over those nominated. This hints at 
the democratic centralism aspect in existence in this system of recruit­
ment; though a lower body approves the nominees for membership in the 
higher body, and the nominees are chosen at the same level as the 
electing body, the higher body has the right to reject certain candi­
dates if it so desires."^
A few key nomenklatura posts, such as the Central Committee 
Secretariat, are probably filled by direct decisions of the Politburo. 
Other high level organizations, such as the Council of Ministers, are 
chosen from their own nomenklatura, exercising total control over the 
selection of the candidates for their posts. The nomenklatura system 
works in the selection of candidates for local, Central Party, and 
higher state positions. The system is more a method of assent
20
Mervyn Matthews, op. cit., p. 13-
29Federic J. Fleron, Jr., ’’The Soviet Political Leadership System, 
1952-19651’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, I diana University, 1 9 6 9), 
p. 1^5-
30Democratic centralism which guides all aspects of Party policies 
and bodies has four main principles which seems to have influence upon 
the nomeklatura system also.
a. election of all Party Executive bodies from bottom to top
b. periodic accountability of Party bodies to their Party 
organizations and to higher bodies
c. strict Party discipline and subordination of minority to
majority
d. the absolutely binding character of the decisions of higher 
bodies upon lower bodies.
These come from the Rules of the Communist Party as quoted in Merle 
Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, op. cit., p. 209-
12
than a system of free choice. The patronage system of political 
mobility flourishes in this type of atmosphere, as will be discussed 
in Chapter V. Soviet elections and nomenklatura or list system are the 
recruitment bases for the Soviet political elite.
Objective and Hypotheses
The objective of this research is to create a realistic picture 
of the Soviet All Union political elite in order to promote a clearer 
understanding of their actions in the political affairs of their 
country and/or the outside world. This group will be analyzed through 
quantitative analysis of their demographic characteristics and a narra­
tive description of their political actions. Characteristics to be 
explored include educational level, occupational status, social class, 
age, nationality and tactics. Four major hypotheses will be investi­
gated, along with several minor ones. The four are as follows:
1. The Soviet political elite (both Party and government) is
a middle-aged group of conservative men.
2. Successful careers of the Soviet political elite (both 
Party and government) are related to educational levels, 
nationality group, age, and occupational status.
3- The Soviet political elite (both Party and government)
epitomizes the "New Soviet Man."*
The Soviet political elite (both Party and government)
constitutes an upper class in Soviet society.*
*
The concept of the "New Soviet Man" refers to the Party’s 
desire to reshape human nature, to effect extensive changes in the minds, 
morals, and manners of the people,-^ create the ideal person who 
dedicates himself to the state and Marxist-Leninist ideology, to the 
extent of living a deprived personal life. In Soviet rhectoric, the 
"New Soviet Man" does not constitute a new class, but rather refers to 
the ideal for the entire society. Major hypotheses #3 and #k both can­
not be true. This will be established.
31Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, Soviet Institutions The 
Individual and Society (Boston, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing
House, 1967), p. 617*
13
The minor hypotheses explore topics related to the major hypotheses
1. The Soviet government elite is powerless in Soviet politics.
2. All Union political institutions, except the Politburo, have 
only "rubber stamp" power.
3- Political behavior as it appears in the Soviet Union demon­
strates the desire of the political elite for power and 
status in Soviet society.
4. Patronage is the overriding factor in political mobility in
the Soviet political system.
5- Ideological orientation is the guiding force in the life of
the Soviet political elite.
In Chapter Six the conclusions arrived at from the material 
presented will be compared with these hypotheses. A discussion of the 
findings will then be presented.
CHAPTER II
THE SUPREME SOVIET AMD THE PARTY CONGRESS
According to the Soviets, the ’highest organs of power' in the
dual hierarchies of the Soviet political system are the Supreme Soviet
and the Congress of the CPSU.’*' Though actual power for both bodies
differs greatly from theoretical power, their representative natures
and large turnover rates seem to support the Soviet contention of mass 
*
participation of the populace in the operation of the Soviet polity. 
Membership in these assemblies is considerable, 1,517 at the 197^ 
Supreme Soviet session and i^-,998 at the 1976 Congress. With the 
comparability of these two organs as to type and purpose, the presenta­
tion of both in the same chapter seems merited.
The purpose of this paper is neither to discuss nor dispute 
the Soviet assertions of the functions of the Party and state institu­
tions. It is to analyze the type of individual v/ho gains membership in 
one of these institutions. Before delving into the data on the member­
ship of each organ, a brief explanation of the organ and its purpose 
will be offered. The state body or bodies will be presented first since 
they are the least powerful. The discussion of the respective Party
*
Participation by the citizens in decision-making and bill 
writing in the Soviet political system.
'*'John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper &
Row, 1978), pp. 112, 1 8 6.
l*f
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organisations will follow, concluding with a summary of the 
characteristics of those chosen as members of the institutions dealt 
with in the chapter.
The Supreme Soviet
From the 1977 Constitution, the Supreme Soviet receives its
2
description as the "highest organ of state power11 in the USSR. It
consists of two 1 equal1^  chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the
Soviet of Nationalities. The former contains one representative for
about every 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 people, though its membership is now stabilized at
767 deputies. Representation in the latter follows a specific formula,
32 deputies from each Union Republic, 11 deputies from each Autonomous
*
Republic, 5 deputies for each autonomous oblast, and 1 deputy for 
*
each okrug. The 1977 Constitution calls for equal memberships in the 
chambers. Table 2-1 shows that this is presently being approached.
The constitutional powers of the Supreme Soviet range from 
exercising all legislative power and approving budgetary and economic 
plans to directing the defense and international relations of the
4Soviet Union. However, with the assembly meeting only eight to ten 
*
Oblast is translated as province and okrug is translated as 
area, either electoral or ethnic.
^Ibid.
3
The Soviets contend equality of the chambers. However, the 
Soviet of the Union has more Communist Party members and Party officials 
in its membership and, therefore, it is described by many as 'more than 
equal' to its counterpart.
4
G. Moiseyev and A. Ardatovsky, Political Democracy in the USSR 
(London: Soviet Booklets), p. 1.
TABLE 2-1
NUMBER OF DEUPTIES IN EACH CHAMBER 
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
Session
Soviet of 
the Union
Soviet of 
Nationalities Total
First - 1937 569 574 1,1^3
Second - 19^6 682 657 1,339
Third - 1950 678 638 1,316
Fourth - 195^ 708 639 1,3 hi
Fifth - 1958 738 6^ -0 1 ,3 7 8
Sixth - 1962 791 652 1,M*3
Seventh - 1966 767 750 1,517
Eighth - 1970 767 750 1,517
SOURCE: M. Saifulin, The Soviet Parliament. (Moscow: Progress >-
Publishers, 1 9 6 7), p- 35; Pravda, July 15, 1970, pp. 2-3, as illustrated 
in Peter Vanneraan, ’’The Supreme Soviet of the USSR” (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 1^5-
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days a year, it has become but a legalizing instrument for Party
approved laws and resolutions- An example of this formal nature of
the Supreme Soviet is illustrated in the following:
• . . on the second day of the first session of the 
Eighth Supreme Soviet, in July 1970, the following 
agenda was completed:
1. election of a new Politburo
2. election of a new Council of Ministers (com­
pleted with no discussion)
3- an All-Union bill concerning basis labor 
legislation was read, 'debated’, and ap­
proved . . .  in one hour and a half; this 
was the first comprehensive labor law passed 
since 1922
4. discussion of various questions of foreign 
policy with two related resolutions passed 
. . .  Since all the agenda items for the session had 
been exhausted, the session was declared closed that
evening.^
Though the Soviets dislike the usage of the term, the Supreme
Soviet could be said to be a 'rubber stamp' organization. Laws do not
orginate on the floor of the chambers and up to the 1970's, not a single
*
bill in a Commission or sub-Commission had been individually or group
£
initiated, though by law, the deputy has this right.
The only time actual discourse may take place is in committee
for deliberating on the details of legislation which implement general
Party directives. An example of this type of discussion follows:
A sub-Commission drafts the fundamentals of the Public Health 
Law. Its Chairman, N. N. Blokhin, is a prominent surgeon and 
scholar, and no newcomer to the Supreme Soviet, having been a 
deputy in its two previous sessions. Invited to this sitting 
by the commission were economists, trade unionists, jurists,
*
In the Soviet government, a committee of one of the chambers 
of the Supreme Soviet is referred to as a Commission.
5
Roy A. Medvedev, On Soviet Democracy (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1975), PP- 133-134.
Ibid., p. 132.
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financial experts and medical men. Every line of the 
projected law was closely scrutinized. Purely stylistics 
alterations were made, then a few substantive ones. An 
argument broke out: may a patient be operated on without
his consent or that of his close relatives?
How are we to get the required consent if, say, the 
patient is in a state of shock? The relatives may be away 
or their whereabouts unknown. The doctor simply has no 
time.
I know of no country where legislation allows for 
forcible operations.
Take an intestinal perforation. You may not get the 
patient’s consent until it’s too late. To save life the 
surgeon should be allowed to operate . . . .
I disagree. During the war some wounded refused to 
be amputated. And though not all, many did get well.
Don’t you understand that I cannot saw off a man's leg 
without his consent?
There are all kinds of cases. You cannot prescribe 
for all of them.
That should be legislatively formalized, lest we tie 
the hands of our doctors in emergencies. When an operation 
is urgent, the surgeon should not have to search for re­
latives or guardians.
They put that down: a doctor may, is obligated even,
to decide for himself, but this in ’exceptional cases’ 
only, when delay 1 imperils the patient's life' and when 
'obtaining consent appears impossible.’ This, eventually, 
was the formula that became law.7
All voting in Commissions, sub-Commissions, and on the floor of 
the chambers is done by "raising the forearm, making a right angle at
g
the elbow." All votes are declared unanimous.
With 72 percent to 76 percent of the deputies being members of 
the Communist Party (see Table 2-2), Party membership is a major con­
sideration in deciding upon nominees for deputy positions. Whereas most
7Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), pp. 262-63-
g
Robert G. Kaiser, Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1976), p. 136.
TABLE 2-2
PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN TEE SUPREME SOVIET 
1937-1970
Year Elected
Communists, as Percent of All Deputies
Combined
Soviet of 
the Union
Soviet of 
Nationalities
1937 8l.O 7 1 .0
19^6 Sk.k 7 7 -6
1930 8 3 .3 8 1 .3
195^ 7 9 .8 73.9
1938 7 6 .3 73.8 7 6 .0
1962 7 3 .2 7 6 A 73-*+
1966 7 ^ .7 73-7 73.2
1970 - 72.3
197*+ - - 75-0
SOURCE: Pravda and Izvestia as Illustrated in Peter Vanneman,
"The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 123.
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of the remaining twenty-four to twenty-eight percent of the membership 
*
are Konsomol officials, up to ten percent may be non-Party personnel.
9However, the latter must have Party approval. A further indication of 
Party control of this body is illustrated by Table 2-3- Though a 
decrease has occurred in the membership of the Party and state officials, 
they still make up roughly one-third of the membership, while forty 
percent of the Central Committee members hold key Supreme Soviet posi­
tions. The highest organ of state power is a Party dominated and 
controlled body.
Second only to Party membership, the level of education seems 
to have become the most important characteristic in examining the quali­
fications of nominees. Table 2-k gives the percentages for levels of 
education for deputies during a twenty-four year period. For those with 
only a primary education, the figure has decreased by twenty-nine 
percentage points, whereas for those completing higher level education, 
it has increased by nine percentage points. Between 193*+ and 1938, the 
drop in the percentage for higher level education could be attributed to 
the power struggle in the Politburo at that time, but the increase in 
this area between 1938 and 1962 is due to Khrushchev’s influence in 
recruiting more educated personnel for government positions. With the 
combined percentages in Table 2-*f for secondary or higher levels of 
education showing a twenty percentage point increase from the fifth 
session to the eighth, this probably reflects a corresponding emphasis 
on higher levels of education occurring in Soviet society at the same tim
*
Konsomol is the name of the Communist Youth Organization.
9Everett M. Jacobs, "Soviet Local Elections: What they are and
What they are not", Soviet Studies (July, 1970) i P- 70.
TABLE 2-3
PERCENTAGE OF PARTY-STATE OFFICIALS AND CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE MEMBERS HOLDING KEY POSITIONS 
IN THE SUPREME SOVIET
Central
Session Party State Committee
195^ - - 2b%
1958 1 9 .0 1 6 .0
1962 1 9 .0 1 6 .0 -
19 66 1 8 .0 15-1 3b%
1970 1 7 .2 l^ f.3 hi.3%
SOURCE: Pravda and Izvestia as illustrated in Peter Vanneman,
’’The Supreme Soviet of the USSR” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 139*
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TABLE 2-b
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE SUPREME SOVIET DEPUTIES
Session - Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh Eighth
Level:
Higher 39% h8% hy/o b9% 50% b8%
Incom.
Higher 7/o 7% 6% b% y% y%
Secondary 22% 17/o 12% 17/o 19% 30%
Incom.
Sec. — 10% 20% 20% 23% 17%
Primary 3 2% 18% 19% 11% 6% 3%
SOURCE: Verkhovni Sovet (Vosmogosziva), statucheskii sbornik
(Moscow: 1970), pp. kO-kl, as illustrated in Peter Vanneman, "The
Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania 
State University, 1972), P- 136.
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Occupation proves to be a difficult characteristic to analyze 
for the deputies of the Supreme Soviet (refer to Table 2-3)- For the 
years 1962 and 1 9 6 6, precise figures in all categories are available. 
However, for the more recent sessions, this is not true. With the Soviet 
biographer’s tendency not to report white collar classifications,^ and 
the percentages in these areas missing, it seems that the Soviets are 
becoming more and more hesitant to admit white collar status and repre­
sentation. This conclusion receives further support if the reported 
worker representation is analyzed. The Supreme Soviet’s compositional 
pattern is allegedj.y a cross section of the best in every occupation. 
Since the worker category dominates the occupied population of the Soviet 
Union, it should also dominate the representation in the Supreme Soviet. 
Up until 1974, its status in the assembly was grossly underrepresented.
In 1974, its proportion of membership increased, but remained well below
12its proportion of the occupied population in the Soviet Union. If the 
unknown percentages of Table 2-3 are intepreted as belonging in the white 
collar, category, then this group has a 39-7 percent representation in 
1970 and 48.4 percent representation in 1974. Both figures are well 
above the corresponding percentages for this occupational group in the 
Soviet Union. The Supreme Soviet does not mirror occupied Soviet society. 
It possesses a disproportionately high share of white collar representa­
tion at the expense of worker representation.
*^Renee Grace Loeffler, ’’The Education of the Soviet Party Execu­
tive” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornwell University, 1973)r P- 162. 
Ms. Loeffler contends in her dissertation that Soviet biographers have a 
tendency to leave out reference to white collar social origin or social 
class membership.
^Peter Vanneman, op. cit., p. 157*
] ?“Roger A. Clarke, ”The Composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet”, 
Soviet Studies (July, 1 9 6 7), p. 57*
TABLE 2-5
OCCUPATIONAL REPRESENTATION AMONG SUPREME SOVIET DUTIES
Category 1962 1966 1970 1974
Workers 21$ 20% 21.7$ 3 2.8$
Peasants 15 17 1 8 .6 1 7 .8
White Collar
Full-time Party 19 18 1 7 .2 17
Full-time Govt. 16 15 15.1 14.1
Military 4 4 3.8 3.7
Farm Directors 8 8 5-3
Economic Managers 1 3 -
Other White Collar 13 11
Unknown 3 3 - -
SOURCE: Pravda and Izvestia, Verkhovni Sovet (Vosmogosoziva),
statucheskii soornik (Moscow: 1970) as illustrated in Peter Vanneman,
nThe Supreme Soviet of the USSR” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 123- John S. Reshetar, Jr., 
The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 183*
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Unlike occupational status, the nationality composition of 
the Supreme Soviet more closely coincides with this aspect in Soviet 
society as a whole. The body is dominated by the Slavic groups, the 
Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Belorussians, just as the population 
as a whole is. Table 2-6 illustrates Supreme Soviet nationality 
representation for the years 1962 and 1 9 6 6, as compared to the 1959  
population census. In 19591 76.28 percent of the population was Slavic, 
but in the Supreme Soviet, only 6l-7 percent and 59*39 percent, respec­
tively, were. Though dominating the assembly, the Slavic group was 
obviously underrepresented. Most of the minority groups, on the other 
hand, were overrepresented. The political leadership, however, realizes 
the importance of having a communication link with the many nationalities 
of the country, plus foster the feeling in the population that they do 
have an impact on decision-making. This overrepresentation of minorities 
on this rather powerless body might be deliberate. It also serves as
excellent evidence to the Soviet claim that their assembly is the most
13representative in the world.
An analysis of the age of deputies represents an insight into 
the Soviet political system as a whole. Table 2-7 illustrates this 
characteristic from the first through eighth session. Two trends are 
evident, the gross increase in the under 30 group between 1950 and 1 9 7 0, 
and the smaller increase in the over 60 group in the 1960!s. The first 
trend implies the rising importance of recruiting younger cadres into 
the operation of the state. The greatest jump between the fifth and 
sixth sessions can be traced to Nikita Khrushchev’s efforts to recruit
13Peter Vanneman, op. cit., p. 157-
TABLE 2-6
NATIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE U.S.S.R. SUPREME SOVIET
Nationality
Population 1939 
Percent
USSR Supreme 
1962  
Percent
Soviet
1966
Percent
Russians 34.65 43-38 42.32
Ukrainians 17.84 14.62 1 3 -1 8
Belorussians 3.79 3-74 3-69
Uzbeks 2 .8 8 2 .9 8 3-43
Georgians 1.29 3-19 3-30
Azerbaijanis 1.41 3 -1 2 3 -1 0
Lithuanians 1 .1 1 2 .0 8 2 .1 1
Moldavians 1 .0 6 1.32 1.43
Latvians O .6 7 1.46 1.83
Kirghiz 0.46 1-32 1-52
Tadzhiks 0.67 1.94 2.31
Armenians 1-33 2.77 3 -1 6
Turkmens 0.48 1-32 1.78
Estonians 0.47 1 .8 7 1.91
Finns 0.04 o.i4 0.07
Jews 1 .0 9 0.33 0-33
Poles 0 .6 6 0 .2 8 0.33
Bashkirs 0.47 0 .8 3 0.39
Buriats 0 .12. 0.33 0.39
Kabardinians 0 .1 0 0.42 0.40
Kalmyks 0.03 0.41 0.40
Karelians 0 .0 8 0.33 0.40
Komis 0 .2 1 0.33 0.39
Maris 0.24 0.42 0.33
Mordvinians 0 .6 2 0.49 0.46
Ossetians 0 .2 0 0.90 0.92
Tatars 2.38 0.97 1-19
Tuvinians 0.03 0-53 0.33
Udmurts 0 .3 0 0.42 0.40
Chechens 0 .2 0 0.33 0.40
Chuvashes 0 .7 0 0 .6 2 0.33
Yakuts 0 .1 1 0.53 0.33
Kara-Kalpaks 0 .0 8 0.42 0.33
Abkhazians 0.03 0.49 0.46
Others 2.42 2.36 2.77
TOTAL 1 0 0 .0 0 1 0 0 .0 0 1 0 0 .0 0
SOURCE: Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Rulers and the Ruled,"
Problems of Communism, XVI, 5 (September-October, I9 6 7), 23.
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TABLE 2-7
DEPUTIES OF SUPREME SOVIET BY AGE GROUP
Session Under 30 31-40 41-50 5 1 -6 0 Over 60
1950 - 3rd 6.5$ 24.8% 49.9^ 14.5% 4.3#
1954 - 4th 8 .2 19.2 44.4 2 3 .6 4.6
1958 - 5th 7-7 2 1 .8 40.5 2 5 .2 4.8
1962 - 6th 14.5 2 8 .1 3 0 .1 22.9 4.4
1966 - 7th 1 2 .0 2 8 .6 27-7 25-4 6.3
1970 - 8th 18.5 2 3 .0 25-5 21.7 11.3
SOURCE: Verkhovni Sovet (Vosmogosoziva), statucheskii
shornik (Moscow: 1970), p. 4o. As illustrated in Peter Vanneman,
1fThe Supreme Soviet of the USSR” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Pennsylvania State University, 1972),p. 144
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young, innovative people into governmental positions. The second trend 
illustrates the beginning of the dominance of the Over 60 group in the 
Supreme Soviet, a trend that developed in the other political institu­
tions as well. With the median age fluctuating between the 31-40 group 
and 41-50 group, plus the government and Party elite holding deputy 
positions and being members of the older generation, the rising of the 
median age seems a clear possibility.
In keeping with Marx's ideal of mass participation in the
central government, the tenure of the average deputy sitting in the
14
Supreme Soviet is not secure. Only the highest Party and government
officials and non-political eminent persons are likely to be re-elected
15to the succeeding sessions of the Supreme Soviet. The turnover rate
in membership has reached as high as 70 percent (see Table 2-8). This
renewal rate influences most the female and less educated or non-Party 
16deputies. It could be speculated that this large turnover rate helps 
prevent the formation of deputy groups that could disagree with the poli­
cies of the Party elite. Supreme Soviet membership provides an excellent 
propaganda tool for the Soviets. Its turnover rate appeal's to 'prove1 
mass participation in the operation of its government.
Distinguished service is another consideration for membership.
The Party is generally fond of symbolism and ceremony. It is proud of 
those who bring honor to the Motherland. Therefore, it often awards such 
people nominations as deputies for the Supreme Soviet. In the 1974
3.4 
?Ibid.
John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 183*
15-
*^Ibid., p. 184.
TABLE 2-8
TURNOVER RATE FOR SUPREME SOVIET DEPUTIES
Year Percentage
1958 62.3
1962 7 0 .0
1966 6 3.A
1975 57-2
SOURCE: John S. Reshelar, 
Harper & Row, 1978), p. iSk,
Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York:
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session, over 73 percent-of the deputies were so decorated, including
17
milkmaids, tractor drivers, coal miners, and factory workers. The
honor of serving as a deputy is enhanced by benefits such as an
honorarium of 100 rubles a month, plus his regular salary while
attending sessions, and free travel on rail, water, and air, including
18all expenses in Moscow. In addition, a member cannot be prosecuted 
or arrested without the consent of his Soviet or in periods between
19sessions, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.
However, if the Party elite decides to demote or retire an official
and the official is a deputy, formal channels are often dispensed with.
To understand further the type of individual recruited as a
deputy, various aspects of the position should be mentioned. Deputies
are elected directly by the people and serve for a period of four years.
They attend the session to listen and not participate, with the possible
exception of minor participation in Commissions or sub-Commissions.
Roy Medevev, a dissident historian, describes their non-participation
in chambers in the following words:
In the years of the existence of the Supreme Soviet, there 
has not been a single occasion on which members have
17Ibid., p. 183.
3.8Mervyn Matthews, ’’Top Incomes in the USSR: Towards a Defini­
tion of the Soviet Elite”, Survey (Summer, 1973)» P- 1-
19G. Moiseyev and A. Ardatovsky, op. cit., p. 3-
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criticized any bill while sitting in chambers. They have 
never rejected a bill or returned one for an amendment.
The major job of a deputy lies in the function of ombudsman for
his constitutents, a spokesman of the criticism from his constituents
to the government. Government ministers are required to reply to deputy
inquiries, in person, within a month’s time, concerning the criticism
and state what action has taken place to remedy the grievance. The
regime allows this channeling of personal grievances about bureaucratic
ineptitude so as to recognize them before they accumulate into dissatis-
21faction with the political system as a whole. Deputies in turn repre­
sent the regime and its policies to their constituents and may hold 
conferences to facilitate this.
The average Soviet politician in the Supreme Soviet is a Party 
member, but not an official. He may or may not be a professional, but' 
he is educated. He is middle-aged and holds either a white collar or 
worker position. He has more than likely performed some meritorious 
service to his country, republic, or local Party organization. His 
nationality is possibly Slavic and chances are he will serve in only 
one session. While he may contribute some to the discussions in Com­
missions or sub-Commissions, he does not participate in chambers, except
20Roy A. Medvedev, op. cit., p. 132. He goes on to say, ’’This 
should not be taken to mean either that the bills as submitted are 
perfect or that no deputies ever have serious doubts about them. More­
over, it is clear from the experience of the past ten to fifteen years 
that many bills passed by the Supreme Soviet have been ill-advised or 
seriously defective in some way or another. Sooner or later it has been 
necessary either to rescind them or to make substantial changes. But 
this has never happened on the initiative of the Supreme Soviet or any 
of its commissions . . .
21Peter Vanneman, op. cit., p. 2^7*
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to register his vote. With the Communist definition of democracy and 
its minority representation, the Supreme Soviet could possibly be 
designated as a "democratic'1 institution.
The Party Congress
The Party Congress is regarded as the highest organ of the
Communist Party by the Party Statutes. It is convened every five
years. Though originally the Congress was an arena for discussion,
deliberations, and spirited debates, at present, because of the sheer
number of persons in attendance, the Congress is neither designed for
22nor capable of deciding important issues. In theory, the delegates
have the right to criticize leadership and their policies at the
Congress, the right to formulate new policies, and elect whom they
choose to lead the Party; however, these democratic potentials have
23never materialized. The Congress functions merely as a sounding 
board, a rally of the faithful, a platform from which leadership 
announces new policies, goals, and modifications in the rules and 
programs, along with obtaining formal approval of new policies or
2bshifts in the top Party command. Voting is alv/ays unanimous and no 
signs of policy disagreement surface. In 19711 Leonard Schapiro 
described the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU as ". . . bland,
22
John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper
& Row, 1978), p. 112.
23Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, Soviet Institutions The 
Individual and Society (Boston, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing
House, 1987)» p- 38.
2kMerle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1 9 6 3), pp. 217-2.1 8.
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uneventful, colorless, and as smooth as a play being performed on
25stage for the third year running." In the psychological sense, the
Party Congress is symbolic of the alleged unity at home and the
ostensible support which Moscow enjoys in the international communist 
26movement. Despite the genuine lack of debate and pro forma nature 
of voting, the Congress provides the delegates with a sense of parti­
cipation, however passive and modest, and with an opportunity to see
27and hear the Party leaders.
Two kinds of delegates attend Party Congresses. Voting ones
represent Party members, and non-voting ones, candidate Party members.
The formula for their election is much more complicated than for their
colleagues in the Supreme Soviet. The following information explains
the election process and norms of representation of delegates to the
Party Congress:
Republic Delegates chosen by
RSFSR Oblast Party Conferences
Krai* Party Conferences 
Large Non-Russian Oblast Conference
Small Non-Russian Republic Party Conferences
Military Units Abroad Select own delegates28
Nomination for delegates is through a list system. Such lists are 
drawn up by nominating committees which are dominated by Party secre­
taries. The list is then presented to the assembly for approval.
*
Krai translates territory.
25Leonard Shapiro, "Keynote-Compromise", Problems of Communism, 
(July-August, 1 97 1), p- 2 .
26Robert J. Osborn, The Evolution of Soviet Politics (Homewood, 
Illinois: The Dorsey Press” 197^)? pp« 212-213-
27John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit , p. 119-
po
Ibid., p. 112.
3**
Rarely is any name on the list not approved. Like the Supreme Soviet,
the Party likes the facade of broad participation. For this reason,
delegates are likely to serve on only one or two Congress. In 1971?
7^.4 percent of the delegates were attending their first conference,
29whereas in 1 9 7 6, 7 3 -5 percent were.
Party membership and a distinguished Party career are necessary 
criteria for a delegate, but the level of education as a consideration 
is rising in importance. Table 2-9 illustrates the trend toward more 
highly educated personnel as Congress delegates. Between 1961 and 1976, 
the percentages of delegates with just an elementary or incomplete 
secondary education dropped by seventeen percentage points, while those 
with a secondary education or higher increased by nearly that much.
With 90 percent of the delegates having a secondary or higher education, 
this lower level Party elite appears to be better educated and probably 
more aware than in previous years.
Occupational status of the Congress delegates as described by 
Table 2-10 presents a false picture of this characteristic. Though 
members of the worker and peasant classes appear to represent 3 1 -3 per­
cent of the total membership in 1 9 7 6, a ten percentage point increase 
from 1 9 7 1? only 77 percent of the 3 ^ -7 percent were actual workers 
while the others were various levels of managers; 28 percent of the
1 7 -7 percent of peasants were farm directors and collective farm chair- 
30men. With this clarification and the -^7-7 percent specified as white 
collar workers, it is obvious that in 1976 the majority of delegates to
29Ibid., p. 1 1 9- 
30Current Digest of the Soviet Press, April, 1976, Number 9?
p . 16 .
TABLE 2-9
EDUCATION LEVEL OF PARTY CONGRESS DELEGATES
Category 1961 1966 1971 1976
Higher 52. 5# 55*3% 5 8.0%
Incom.
Higher
Secondary
5-2
19.1
2*f. 0 2 7 .0
9 0 .0
Incom.
Secondary
or
Elementary
2 7 -2 20.5 15.0 1 0 .0
SOURCE: (Table based on data in reports of chairmen of 
Credentials Commissions at Party Congresses), as reported in John S. 
Reshelar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978),
p. 1 1 8.
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TABLE 2-10
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF PARTY CONGRESS DELEGATES
Category 1961 1966 1971 1976
Worker 31.5# 33-0^ 24.0$£ 34.1^
Peasant 16.9 18.9 17.3 17-7
White Collar
Party Official 
Government 
Official
26.3
10.3
2 6 .0
1 1 .6
24.3
1 1 .2
2 2 .2
1 3 .8Others 2.3 2.7 2.3
Military 6.9 7-6 - 3-4
Academic 7.0 3.4
SOURCE: (Table based on data in reports of chairmen of 
Credentials Commissions at Party Congresses), as reported in John S. 
Reshelar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978),
p. 1 1 8.
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the Party Congress represented the white collar stratum of the Party
membership rather than the worker-peasant stratum. Herbert McCloskey
and John Turner support this discovery by stating in i9 6 0, in their
book The Soviet Dictatorship,
The Congress represents the elite rather than a cross section 
of the Party and is dominated by professional Communist 
leaders from the executive committees of the several levels 
of the Party organs.
As is the case in the Supreme Soviet, the Slavic nationality 
dominates the Party Congress. Table 2-11 illustrates Republic repre­
sentation in the Congress as compared to its representation in the 
1970 census. The figures show that the RSFSR republic is clearly over­
represented while the Ukrainian Republic is underrepresented. With the 
importance of the Ukraine to the agriculture of the country, this may 
seem a little surprising. However, the leaders in Moscow are Russian, 
not Ukrainian as under Khrushchev, and this may be the reasoning behind 
it. The Kazakhs and Uzbek are also underpresented, but considering 
their locations and foreign cultures, this could be understandable.
The Soviet Union will probably continue to show Russian predominance 
in Party organs simply because of their overwhelming position within 
the state. To compare this representation with that of the Supreme 
Soviet, one is dealing with nationality groups versus republic groups. 
Still, an observation can be made. The Slavic nationalities have 
greater representation in the Party Congress whereas the minorities 
have fairer representation in the Supreme Soviet. With the latter 
being the assembly of the state, having its representation often used 
as a propaganda tool, this discrepancy can easily be explained.
^Herbert McClosky and John Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship
(New York: McGraw-Hill, i9 6 0), p. 297»
TABLE 2-11
REPUBLIC REPRESENTATION IN' THE PARTY CONGRESS
1970 Census 1976 Party Congress
Republic Population % Delegation %
RSFSR 130,697,000 54.1 3,035 6 0 .7
Ukraine 47,496,000 2 0 .0 894 17.9
Kazakh 1 3 ,0 6 8 ,0 0 0 3.4 218 4.4
Uzbek 1 2,3 0 5 ,0 0 0 5.1 159 3.2
Beylorussian 9,074,000
CO•lA 172 3.4
Azerbaijan 5 ,2 1 9 ,0 0 0 2 .2 96 1-9
Georgia 4,734,000 2 .0 107 2 .1
Moldavian 3 ,6 1 9 ,0 0 0 1-5 44 .9
Lithuania 3 ,1 6 6 ,0 0 0 1.3 49 1 .0
Kirgiz 3 ,0 0 3 ,0 0 0 1 .2 37 .7
Tadzhik 2 ,9 8 7 ,0 0 0 1 .2 32. .6
Armenia 2,545,000 1 .1 47 .9
Latvia 2 ,3 8 6 ,0 0 0 1 .0 51 1 .0
Turkman 2 ,2 2 3 ,0 0 0 • 9 27 .3
SOURCE: (Table based on data in report from chairman of
Credentials Commissions for the 1976 Party Congress), Current Digest of 
the Soviet Press, April 9, 1976, p. 16. World Book Encyclopedia,
Vol. 16 (Chicago: Eield Enterprises Educational Corporation, 1977),
p. 494.
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When discussing the age characteristic of delegates, the trend 
found for deputies is followed (refer to Table 2-12). Congress delegates 
are gradually becoming older. Since most of the Party elite are members 
of the middle to old age group and foster the careers of older cadres, 
often discriminating against younger ones, this trend seems as if it 
will continue, possibly pushing the percentage of delegates Over 50 to 
nearly one-third. An interesting note is the sudden increase in younger 
delegates for the 1961 Congress. But, as in the case of deputies to the 
Supreme Soviet, this is probably due to the influence of Nikita 
Khrushchev and his belief in revitalizing the Party with the young. How­
ever, after his ouster in 1964, the senior elite returned to a more 
conservative outlook and the percentages of the Under 40 group eventually 
declined, with those of the Over 50 group beginning to increase.
The Soviet politician of the Party Congress is either a Party
official or has distinguished himself as a Party member. He probably
holds a white collar position and could be classified as a professional.
He is middle aged and educated. He most likely is of Russian descent
and will only serve for one or two convocations. He does not feel the
need to question or criticize Party leaders on the issues they present
to the Congress. The Party Congress endows the Party leadership with a
degree of apparent legitimacy, giving them a vehicle, the delegate,
through which they can relate their policies and programs to the rank
32and file members in Party throughout the country.
32John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 119.
TABLE 2-12
AGE OF PARTY CONGRESS DELEGATES
Category 1961 1966 1971 1976
4-0 or under 38.6$ 40.2% 31.8#
70.3
'+1 -5 0 37.9 34.3 41.6
Over 50 23*3 25.3 2 6 .6 2 9 .3
SOURCE: (Table based on data in reports of chairmen of
Credentials Commissions at Party Congresses). As reported in John S. 
Reshelar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978),
p. 1 1 8.
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Summary
The Soviet politicians for both bodies can be considered, at
3 ^the least, members of the lower stratum of elites. For the most part, 
they are educated and have achieved some form of recognition, either 
for their Party or for the state. They are more than likely of middle 
age and may be Slavic, though in the Supreme Soviet, their nationality 
may be from a minority group. They probably hold white collar position 
for though the Supreme Soviet shows near equality between worker- 
peasant status and white collar status, the Party Congress is definitely 
a white collar organization. Between the two organizations, the Supreme 
Soviet is more representative in minority and worker-peasant representa­
tion. The older generation predominance in the Supreme Soviet possibly 
illustrates the higher importance that the Party elite puts on deputy 
status rather than delegate status. The great Soviet myth of the lowly 
proletarian rising to participation in his state government on his Party 
is only slightly supported by this chapter.
33The reason that the phrase 'at least1 was used was that some 
members of both the Supreme Soviet and the Party Congress are also 
members of the Central Committee, Council of Ministers, or even Polit­
buro. If they do hold that type of membership, then they are considered 
members of the upper or top stratum of elites.
CHAPTER III
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS/CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU 
The major purposes of the Council of Ministers and the Central 
Committee of the CPSU— administering and controlling the vast bureau­
cracies of their respective areas— indicate basic similarities between 
these two very different organizations. Though each is declared to be 
an actual seat of power, in practice each is only an executor, with 
little initiative power. Their memberships, however, are considered 
the upper political elite of Soviet society and enjoy the privileges 
and status that accompanies this designation. The comparative resem­
blance between the functions and membership of these organizations has 
suggested the discussion of both in the same chapter.
Further similarities between the two involve size and position in 
their respective hierarchies. Though the institutions themselves vary 
greatly in size, the percentages of their size to those of their respec­
tive assemblies are comparable (see Table 3-1)• With but a 1.2 percentage 
point difference in their proportional percentages, it can be stated that 
these two organizations are of equivalent size in proportion to their 
respective assemblies. As to placement in the structure of their respec­
tive hierarchies, both organizations are subordinate to an assembly yet 
accountable to a Presidium (see Appendix A). Though the Council of 
Ministers is positionally equal to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,
it is constitutionally accountable and responsible to the Supreme Soviet
b2
TABLE 3-1
COMPARATIVE MEMBERSHIP FIGURES FOR THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU
Organization 1976 Membership Percentage
Council of Ministers 111
Supreme Soviet (197*0 1,917 7-3
Central Committee k26
Party Congress (1976) *f,998 8-5
SOURCE: John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: 
Harper & Row, 197$), pp. 117, ll8, 179* "Chiefs of State and Cabinet 
Members of Foreign Governments", C.I.A. R ference Aid, 1977, pp. 69-71.
4-3
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and between sessions, to its Presidium.^- The Central Committee, by 
Party Statutes, is responsible and accountable to the Party Congress, 
but in practice, to the Politburo. The Council of Ministers and the 
Central Committee share several characteristics which make them com­
parable organizations.
The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers, according to the 1977 Constitution,
is the 'highest executive and administrative organ of the state 
2authority'. According to a Soviet source, it oversees the enormous 
state bureaucracy, supervises the development of the budget and all 
monetary matters, administers all Party and state policies in foreign 
and domestic areas, and controls a substantial part of the activities 
of the bureaucracies of the union republics.'' It can also issue decrees 
and orders which are binding throughout the Soviet Union. Its membership 
consists of a Chairman, two First Deputy Chairmen, eleven Deputy Chair­
men, and numerous ministers and chairmen of State Committees. The chair­
men of the Council of Ministers of each union republic also merit member­
ship. Members are selected by the nomenklatura of the Council of
Ministers and 'elected' by the Supreme Soviet at the first session of
*
each new convocation.
*
Convocation is a word used to designate the assembling of the 
Supreme Soviet.
■^ Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation), Pennsylvania State University, 1972, pp. 200-201.
2
John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper 8c
Row, 1978), p. 190.
3
G. Moiseyev and A. Ardatovsky, Political Democracy in theUSSR 
(London: Soviet Booklets, 1 9 6 9)? p. 1.
The evidence of Communist Party control of this body comes 
through an analysis of its membership. First, currently and similarly 
in the past, six full members and two candidate members of the Polit­
buro hold positions in the Council of Ministers, including the second 
most powerful man in the Soviet Union, Alexis Kosygin. His position 
as Chairman of this organization gives him the title of Premier of the 
Soviet Union. Central Committee membership by government ministers
further illustrates Party domination. Table 3-2 uses a sample of the
*
1968 Council as an example. In 1976, sixty-six Council members sat 
on the Central Committee. This overlapping of membership continues to 
support the assertion of Communist Party power over the governmental 
apparatus of the Soviet Union.
Data on the characteristics of members of this state body is 
very difficult to obtain. Research on the Communist Party, its organi­
zations and its membership is more prevalent in Soviet studies. However, 
one study has been found that gives various statistical information 
which seems to generally describe the type of individual who might 
achieve membership in the Council of Ministers. This study is "The 
Education of the Soviet Party Executive" by Renee Grace Loeffler. She 
uses classifications of Party Executives, Government Executives, and 
Economic Executives. The latter two will be used as typifying the 
candidate for an All Union minister position or state committee chair­
manship. The first category will be used for comparison purposes.
Table 3-3 sets forth her definitions of these categories. Whereas her 
statistics include characteristics of both All Union and republic level
*
The figure sixty-six was derived by information in Tables 3-10
and 3-11•
TABLE > 2
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN THE, CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU FOR TEE YEAR 1968 (A SAMPLE)
Percent on Central Committee 
Category of Each Category
Chr., Deputy Chr., and Ministers 96%
Chr. of State Committees 8l%
Chr. of Republic Council of Ministers 100%
SOURCE: George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society,
(New York: Atherton Press, 1 9 6 8), p. 121.
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TABLE 3-3
GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC EXECUTIVES (DEFINITIONS)
Groups Year - 1962
Number in Sample
1 . USSR Council of Ministers Chairman. First 
Deputy Chairmen, Deputy Chairmen 3
2 . USSR Ministers 9
3- USSR State Committee Chairmen, Gosplan 
Chairman or Deputy Chairman 23
4. Republic Council of Ministers Chairmen 8
3. Republic Gosplan Chairmen, Sovnarkhoz 
Chairmen 21
6 . Republic Capitol City Executive Committee 
Chairmen 4
7- Province Executive Committee Chairmen 46
8 . Province Sovnarkohoz Chairmen 26
Total ibO
(in one sample used)
Government Executives - 1, 4, 6 and 7 
Economic Executives - 3i 5, 8
USSR ministers were divided between the two categories according 
to the nature of the particular ministry.
Party Executives refer to representatives of Party Officials from 
Province level to All Union level.
SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, ’’The Education of the Soviet
Party Elite” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation), Cornell University,
1975), p. 48.
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state officials, about 26 percent of the figure for Government 
Executive and 33 percent of the figure for Economic Executives repre­
sent All Union level. Though these percentages are rather small, the 
statistics do describe the sample from which the members of the Council 
of Ministers are usually drawn.
The statistics used for this section are for the year 1962.
Though that dates them by sixteen years, they can still serve as an 
indicator of the type of individual who may achieve membership in this 
state elite group. The major reason for this comes from the low turn­
over rate for the Council of Ministers (see Table 3-4). Between 1968  
and 1977» this rate was only 33 percent. In contrast to the Supreme 
Soviet membership or even the Politburo membership, the Council of 
Ministers represents a relatively stable, unchanging organization. The 
type of individual who might become a member could as well be described 
by Ms. Loeffler's statistics as by more recent information.
The statistics on education illustrate the importance placed on 
this area in choosing a member of the Council of Ministers, as well as 
the skill and intelligence possessed by these individuals. Table 3-3 
shows the tremendous advantage of Economic Executives in the area of 
higher learning, and for them, the unimportance of any type of Party 
School. The Table also demonstrates the emphasis of education for all 
Soviet Executives, with over 60 percent in each category having com­
pleted college or college and Party School. Intelligence comes into view 
with Table 3-6. If early graduation is associated with higher intelli­
gence, then the Government Executive has a definite advantage in ability. 
Without this assumption, it can still be hypothesized that members of the 
executive group in the Soviet Union begin their careers at an early age
TABLE 3-k
TURNOVER RATE OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Category
Number of Ministers 
in Positions in 1971
Number of Positions 
Net Held by Same Men 
in 1968
Chairman and First 
Deputy Chr. 3 0
Deputy Chairmen 11 k
USSR Ministers 62 16
State Comm.' Chr. 19 10
Chr. of Rep. Council 
of Ministers 13 9
Total 110 39
(Six Minister positions in 1977 were not in existence in 196 8)
Percent of turnover between 1977 and 1968 - 35%
SOURCE: "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign
Governments", CIA Reference Aid, 1877? pp« 69-71* USSR, A Strategic 
Survey, 1969 (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
I9 6 9)? P- 185? Appendix C.
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TABLE 3-5
LEVEL OF EDUCATION FOR 1962  
FOR SOVIET EXECUTIVES
Percent of Total with that Level
Category Party Government Economic
No Higher Education 11# 15% 5%
Party School Only 27 20 2
College 48 56 91
College and Party School 14 9 2
SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, "The Education of the Soviet
Party Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1975)?
p. 63-
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TABLE 3-6
AGE OF COLLEGE GRADUATION*
Age
Party
Executive
Government
Executive
Economic
Executive
22 or less 17% 26%
00H
23 to 25 30 23 32
26 to 30 27 18 22
Over 30 13 12 9
Unknown 12 21 19
*
In many cases the biographical sources did not give the exact 
time of college graduation, and therefore, certain assumptions were 
made in coding this question. Specifically, if an executive had a 
higher education; there was no specific information about when he com­
pleted college; he took his first known job in his early twenties; the 
job was of the sort that usually required a higher education; then it 
was assumed, if there was no indication to the contrary, then he gradu­
ated immediately before assuming his first job. Because of these 
assumptions, the da.ta on age of college graduation is relatively soft.
SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, ’’The Education of the Soviet
Party Elite” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1975)i 
p. 75-
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since over 50 percent of them had completed college by the time they 
became twenty-five years old. Table 3-7 shows the area of concentra­
tion of these executives. Though the emphasis for engineers and 
agronomists is clearly evident among the Soviet executives, the 
extremely large number of engineers among the Economic Executives 
points to a purposeful technocratic influence on Soviet economics, an 
innovation which can be traced to Nikita Khrushchev. The upper 
political elite in the state hierarchy appear to be highly educated, 
intelligent, and technically skilled.
The validity of the above conclusion, however, could be ques­
tioned. Though the existence of degrees, especially in agronomy and 
engineering is very high among Soviet executives, the competence in 
these areas may not be high. Robert Kaiser in his book Russia describes 
this phenomenon in the following words:
Some Soviet officials, the unqualified carreerists . . .  
simply too stupid to be condemned, dull-witted, auto­
matically selfish people to whom moral or even intellec- 
tural considerations were alien. Because merit alone is 
often insufficient to earn advancement, the best people 
often do not rise to the top. Many of the worst people 
get there.^
Fedor Fanfero in his novel Volga-Matushaka Reka also illustrates
how 'the worst people get there1. Though his novel is dated, his
example is illustrative of what presently could occur in Soviet society.
Semen Malinov was a student at the Bauman Institute, one 
of the finest engineering schools in the Soviet Union, and 
he was subsequently to become an obkom first secretary.
Semen had one main gift— the ability to speak and to imitate.
Thanks to such oratorical gifts, Semen Malinov was ’loaded1 
and ’overloaded' with assignments: he was one of the
Komsomol leaders in the Institute, the chairman of the civil
Robert Kaiser, Russia (New York: Atheneuin, 1976), p. 195-
TABLE 3-7
TYPE OP HIGHER EDUCATION
Category
Party
Executive
Government
Executive
Economic
Executive
No Higher Ed. 11# 15% 5%
Party School Only 27 20 2
Engineering 26 22 83
Agronomy 18 2b 2
Others 18 19 8
SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, ’’The Education of the Soviet
Party Elite” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1973)? 
p. 65.
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defense unit, in the Aid to the Revolutionaries Society, 
and even in the sports circle • • • * And science?
Science remained somewhere at the side. He did not drag 
himself to the books and he listened to lectures according 
to the proverb: 'In one ear and out the other.* But it
was necessary to pass the exams, and Semen Malinov un­
willingly had to resort to the method of 'dodging. 1 To 
some teachers he gave his honored word: 'I'll hand it
in! I'll hand it in! Word of honor, I'll hand it in!
Just give me a grade now . . .  I will get it to you.'
To others who were a little sterner, he answered the 
questions with patter, impudently looking into their 
eyes. When he did not hit the point, he began to com­
plain about being swamped with work. The 'stern' 
professor would yield, saying 'Yes, yes, I know. I know.
I’ve seen your picture in the Konsomol newspaper . . . .'
And he wrote on the grade sheet 'Passes.' With such 
dodges Malinov left the institute, having received the 
diploma of an engineer but not the knowledge of one.5
The position of a member of the Council of Ministers does 
require skill and ability, but with the patronage system and tactics 
used in Soviet politics as described in Chapter V, the possibility that 
these characteristics lie in a non-technical area exists.
The social orgins of the state executives present an insight 
into Soviet politics. It must be understood that these origins are 
the classes in which the executive was born and may not correspond to 
his present social class (see Table 3~8). (The "unknown" category, in 
the analysis, will be grouped with the white collar group, for Ms. 
Loeffler indicated in her dissertation the tendency of Soviet biographer 
to leave out social origin if it refers to a white collar classification 
Though not always true, it occurs often enough to justify grouping the 
two together.)
For Party and Government Executives, peasant class origins 
predominate. Two basic reasons can explain this. The first concerns
5
Jerry Hough, The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1969 )» P* 363, quoted from n. 1 1.
TABLE 3-8
CLASS ORIGINS OF EXECUTIVES
Classification
Party
Executive
Government 
Executive .
Economic
Executive
Worker
ooOJ 21% 33%
Peasant ^7 51 23
White Collar 6 k 11
Unknown 19 2k 33
SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, "The Education of the Soviet
Party Elite” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 197D)? 
p. 163-
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the age of these men. Though statistics on this characteristics are 
unavailable for members of the Council of Ministers,with most of the 
members sitting in the Central Committee (refer to Table 3-2) and the 
majority of Central Committee members over fifty (refer to Table 3-16 
and 3-17), then it can be assumed that the majority of the Soviet state 
executives are over fifty. With this clarification and considering the 
social classes in the Soviet Union at the time of these men’s birth, 
the large representation of peasantry does not seem unusual. Also, an
Economic Executive needs specialized training. This was not usually
available to the average peasant in the Soviet Union at that time,
therefore they opted for Party or Government careers.
The figures for the Economic Executives show a different picture. 
This group’s strength is in both the worker and white collar group, if 
the latter is combined with the ’’unknown” group. The large worker 
representation can be explained in two ways. First, as in the previous 
situation, the era in which these men were born might dictate such a 
representation. Second, with an Economic Executive needing precise 
technical skills and the government offering numerous scholarships to 
the technical institutes, the possibility of easier access to these by 
the worker group exists. White collar representation offers another 
explanation. Economic careers in the Soviet Union mean stability and 
less restrictions on personal life than do Party careers. This accounts 
for their popularity in the white collar group. With the children of 
successful people inheriting their parents' status, though not political 
power and assured of the opportunity of admission into the best schools
51
(see Chapter V), a self-perpetuating aspect of this career, type in the 
white collar group appears.^
Currently, All Union state officials are members of the upper 
stratum of Soviet society; however, by analyzing their class origins, 
career patterns and opportunities among the classes can be implied.
The similarity between the origins of the Government and Party Execu­
tives could be explained by the fact that most Government Executives 
are drawn from the Party Executive ranks and that a Party career has 
been very attractive for members of the lower classes. Summing up the 
characteristics already discussed, there seems to be a link between 
education, technical skill, and social origin in the elites of the 
state apparatus in the Soviet Union.
The Council of Ministers, though a body to resolve bureaucratic 
problems of all the republics, seems to be dominated by the people of 
one nationality group, the Russians. Table 3~9 gives statistics for 
the year 1962 for the sample in Ms. Loeffler's statistics. If the 
92 percent figure of Russian nationality representation is compared 
with the 5k percent figure of Russian nationality representation in the 
total population of 1999 (refer to Table 2-6), the gross overepresenta­
tion of the Russian nationality in Ms. Loeffler's sample of the Council 
of Ministers is apparent. (It can be assumed that her sample is repre­
sentative for the organization at that time.) An interesting aspect of 
this is that in 1 9 6 2, Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian was the Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers yet, his Council appears to have been over­
represented by Russians! If this representation is compared to the
Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. l8l.
TABLE 3-9
DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONALITY GROUPINGS AMONG EXECUTIVES
.
Category
Posts on the USSR Level 
for the year 1962
Russians 32%
More Developed k
Less Developed k
Economically More Developed 
Estonian, Latvian, and Ukrainian.
include: Armenian, Georgian,
*j^
Economically Less Developed include: Azerbaidzhan, Kazakh, 
Kirgiz, Tadzhik, Turkmen, Uzbek, Lithuanian, Belorussian, and 
Moldavian.
SOURCE: George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society,
(New York: Atherton Press, 1 9 6 8), pp. ?4-75*
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Russian representation in the Supreme Soviet in 1962 (see Table 2-6), a 
large inconsistency exists. Supreme Soviet deputies of Russian nationa­
lity accounted for only percent of its membership at that time. 
However, with the Supreme Soviet being the Soviet ’parliament’, the 
Council of Ministers, being the Soviet state ’executive’ and the 
Russian nationality the largest, plus most dominant in the nation, this 
discrepancy could possibly be explained.
The typical Soviet- politician of the Council of Ministers is 
a technical skilled and educated individual of some intelligence, with 
a lower class origin. He is of middle age, a professional, and pro­
bably a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. His nationality 
is most likely Russian. Whereas he may have secured his position for 
reasons other than competence, he probably displays some skill in the 
area of his position. The appeal for careers in the state apparatus 
may origins.te more from its security and less restrictive life than 
from a deep commitment to the Soviet state and the ideological goals 
of communism.
The Central Committee of the CPSU
Originally, the Politburo of the CPSU was to be a branch of the
more powerful Central Committee. However, as the size of the latter
increased (see Table 3-10),the purposes of the two bodies were reversed,
7
and the Central Committee became an instrument of the Politburo.
*
Lenin attributed this transformation to infrequent plenary sessions 
*
Plenary is the word referring to a full sitting of the Central 
Committee.
7
Wasyl Kalyncwvch, ’’The Top Elite of the Communist Party of the 
USSR” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972), p. 108.
TABLE >10
NUMERICAL GROWTH OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Year Full Members Candidate Members
1917 9 4
1919 19 8
1921 23 13
1923 40 17
1923 63 43
1927 71 30
1934 71 68
1932 123 111
1936 133 122
1961 173 133
1966 193 163
1971 241 133
1976 287 139
SOURCE: Wasyl Kalynowych, "The Top Elite of the Communist
Party of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University,
1 9 7 2), p. 1 1 1.
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and the daily decision-making functions of the Politburo and 
8Secretariat. In 1923 Lenin stated,
The plenum of the Central Committee of our Party has already 
disclosed its tendency to develop into a sort of Party con­
ference. It meets on the average of no less than once in 
two months, and the current work in the name of the Central 
Committee is carried on by our Politburo . . . .  I think 
that we should complete this path on which we have entered 
and convert the plenums of the Central Committee into higher
Party conferences.9
Following this direction, the Central Committee has evolved into the 
second level of the Party leadership, the overseer of the Central Party 
apparatus, and a depository from which Politburo members are chosen.^ 
According to Soviet sources, the Central Committee directs all 
Party activities and bodies between sessions of the Party Congress, 
appoints Party officials, organizes and manages enterprises which have 
general Party character, and manages all Central Party funds.^ In 
practice, it has become a strictly planned forum which is used by the 
top Party elite for purposes of informing Central Committee members of 
and promoting new Party policies. It could be classified as a ’rubber 
stamp' organization for the passage of Party resolutions. Topics dis­
cussed at the plenums range from economics to ideology to reorganization. 
Speeches can last from one to eight or more hours.
Despite the facade of policy-making or decision-making power, the 
Central Committee does oversee a large bureaucracy, the Central Party 
o
Ibid., p. 118.
9Ibid., p. 1 1 9.
*^Roy D. Laird, The Soviet Paradigm (New York: The Free Press,
1970), p. 1 0 1.
asyl Kalynowych, op. cit., p. 107-
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Apparatus. This consists of 900 staff workers assisted by 2400 other
personnel, plus several in-house Party organizations and their
12respective staffs. Though it does not initiate any policy, m  rare
instances it has been known to mediate disputes or deadlocks among the
top Party leaders. It also has exercised power in regard to the fate
of a leader. In 1957? though voted out as leader by the members of the
Politburo, Nikita Khrushchev was able to retain his position by an
13affirmative vote of the Central Committee. Though the actual power 
of the Central Committee varies, its high status in the Soviet Union 
is always prevalent.
Membership in the Central Committee consists of upper Party and 
government political elites (see Table 3-11)• Membership is secured as 
a function of one of the following:
1. power - member of the top elite such as the Politburo or its 
Secretariat
2. position - position in government or Party merits membership 
3 - representation - nationality and social representation
4. specialization - holders of specially needed skills or 
experts
5» symbo3.ic - special persons such as cosmonauts
Final decisions as to membership belong to the Party elite and the core
elite (see Table 3-19) of the Committee. The perceptions of the top
leadership as to the personnel and recruitment needs of the Committee
15
becomes a most important imput in the decisions on membership. A 
12A. Pravdin, ’’Inside the CPSU Central Committee”, Survey, 
(Autumn, 197^)? p- 96.
13Thomas H. Rigby, ’’How Strong is the Leader”, Problems of 
Communism (September-October, 1962), pp. 4-6.
^Joseph P. Mastro, ’’The Soviet Political Elite" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 50.
1<5Ibid.
TABLE 3-11
MAJOR CATEGORIES IN VOTING MEMBERSHIP 
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Year 1966 1971 1976
Oblast and Irai Sec. 2 3.0$ 2*f.O# 28.9#
USSR Govt. Ministers 1.8.9# 2 2. A# 2 3.0#
Union Rep. Cen. 
Com. Sec. , 9.8# 8 .0# 6 .6#
CPSU Cen. Comm. Sec., 
and Dept. Heads 6 .6# 5.8# 3.2#
Union Rep. Prem. and 
Dep. Prem. h.6% 3-3# 3.8#
Military 7.8# 8 .0# 7.0#
Other categories include:
City Committee Secretaries 
Secretaries of Autonomous Republics 
Aides to CPSU General Secretary
Party Committees
SOURCE: John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York:
Harper & Row, 1978), p. !1 2 1.
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revealing aspect about Central Committee membership is the trends in 
recruitment as indicated in Table 3-11- Between 1966 and 1976, 
provincial secretary representation increased by 3*9 percentage points 
and government minister membership by k*l percentage points. Republic 
and AID. Union Party representation, much smaller originally, decreased 
by 3*2 and 1.^ percentage points, respectively. This implies the 
importance of provincial status in ones career growth and the prefer­
ence for these people over the more sophisticated though possibly not 
as trustworthy Central Party or regional Party personnel for Central 
Committee membership. From Table 3-11? it can also be assumed that 
greater importance has been recently placed on elite government posi­
tions in Party organizations, than in previous years. Formally, the 
Committee is elected at the penultimate session of the Party Congress
with a secret ballot; but the list on the ballot never exceeds the
l6number of seats in the Committee. Since top government and Party
elite make up 8l.l percent of the membership of the Central Committee,
1*7(they make up only 2.1 percent of the total Party membership), the 
Central Committee of the CPSU can legitimately be described as a body 
wherein the upper political elite of the Soviet Union can be found.
The growth in the level of educational training for Central 
Committee members was emphasized in the following words by Leonid 
Brezhenv in 1971:
■^John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 112.
17Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change", 
Problems of Communism (December, 1 9 6 6), p. 39*
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Life is making continuously greater demands on cadres. We 
need people who combine a high level of political conscious­
ness with a sound professional training, people who can 
knowledgeably tackle the problems of economic and cultural 
development and are well-versed in modern methods of manage­
ment •
As Table 3-12 shows, the 1960's brought an increase in the
level of education of members in the Central Committee. Brezhnev's
words indicate this trend is continuing. The Table also shows a tend-
19ency to coopt persons in a specialized field of higher education.
The impetus for both of these aspects could be attributed to 
Nikita Khrushchev and his belief in the need for recruitment of techno­
crats in the Party hierarchical positions. The substantial drop in 
those with only Party School training implies the growing emphasis on 
formal and technical education and the de-emphasizing of the more 
ideologically oriented members or less educated personnel. This 
importance on education and specialized training has transformed the 
Central Committee into a highly trained and specialized group. In 
choosing membership in the future, it seems assured that educational 
level and technical training will probably become deciding factors.
Occupational representation indicates the dominance of the 
white collar stratum of Soviet society in the membership of the Central 
Committee (see Table 3-13)• While Party Apparatus members show a 
slight decline in membership, state personnel show an increase. This 
is similar to the evidence presented in Table 3-11 which described some
ilS
Joseph P. Mastro, op. cit., p. 2?8.
19Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central 
Committee: An Elite Analysis", The American Political Science Review
(December, 1 9 6 8), p. 1233-
TABLE 3-12
LEVEL AND TYPE OF EDUCATION OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Category 1961 1966
College 7b% 8 2.6^
Military - 8 .1
University - 9-3
Technical - 6 3 .2
Party School only 10 4.4
Incomplete College 8 -
Secondary 4 2 .2
Less than Secondary 4 • 3
SOURCE: Yaroslav Bilinsky, Changes in Central Committee
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961-1966 (Denver: University of
Denver, 1967)1 p* 46. Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The 
Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis", American Political
Science Review (December, 1 9 6 8), p. 1233-
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TABLE 3-13
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP REPRESENTATION IN THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE IN 1961 AND 1966
Category 1961 1966
Party Apparatus
00-4- h3%
State and Economic Officials 34 38
Military 9-3 9-7
Culture and Science 3.4 4.2
Police -
Workers and Peasants - 2 .8
Others 3-3 2 .3
SOURCE: Wasyl Kalynowych, ’’The Top Elite of the Communist Party
of the USSR’’ (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972)?
p. 126.
67
68
of the membership groups in the Committee. The three main categories 
in Table 3-13 show a general range of percentages for these types of 
membership. This could support the claim that recruitment of Central 
Committee membership is based upon function areas and the perception 
of needs for membership by the leadership. The low representation of 
workers and peasants further verifies the assertion that the Central 
Committee is an elite element in the Communist Party apparatus.
The nationality representation in the Central Committee is 
similar to representation in the other political bodies discussed (see 
Table 3-14). The Slavic group controls. Whereas the representation in 
1961 for the Russian representation was 43 percent in the Supreme Soviet
and around 80-90 percent in the Council of Ministers, it was 38 percent
in the Central Committee indicating, as in the others, its dominance of
the Committee. Also, as in most of the other bodies, this nationality
group is overrepresented, but as mentioned previously, with the import­
ance of this group of people to the Soviet Union, this aspect does not 
seem unusual. In deciding upon new members (see Table 3-13)1 there 
appears to be a preference for representation from the Russian national­
ity. The power of the top Party elite in the decision-making process of 
choosing new members for the Central Committee insures the dominance of 
whichever nationality group it prefers.
Age represents a further insight into the membership of the 
Central Committee. In referring to Table 3-16, the trend toward an 
older membership is apparent. In 1936, 46.61 percent were 50 years or 
older; in 1961, 62.29 percent were; in 1 9 6 6, 78.47 percent were. The 
dominance of the older generation in the Committee is further illustrated 
by Table 3-17 which illustrates the change in the average age and median
TABLE 3-3.k
NATIONALITY REPRESENTATION III THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Nationality 1961 - % 1966 - %
Russians 38-29 ^7-93
Ukranians 2 0 .0 0 1 8. k6
Belorussians 3-^3 3-13
Uzbeks 2.29 1.3^
Kazakhs 1 .1 +^ 2 .0 3
Georgians l.l*f 1.03
Azerbaijanis .37 .31
Lithuanians .37 •31
Moldavians .37 .31
Latvians l.l*f 1-3^
Kirghiz .37 .31
Tadzhiks .37 .31
Armenians 1.71 1.3^
Turkmens .37 .31
Estonians .37 .31
Finns .37 -
Jews .37 .31
Bashkirs .37 .31
Tartars .37 .31
SOURCE: Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Ruler and the Ruled", Problems
of Communism, 1963? as illustrated in Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State 
University, 1972)', p. 38^.
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TABLE. 3-15
NATIONALITY OF NEW MEMBERS
Nationality I96I ~ % 1966 - %
Russians 62.9 67.03
Ukrainians 16.13 13.38
Beloruss ians 3.23 1 .1 0
Uzbeks 2.42 .0
Kazaks
H00• .0
Azerbaidzhanians
H00• 1 .1 0
Armenians 1 .6 1 2 .2 0
Georgians .0 1 .1 0
Moldavians
H00• . 0
Tadzkiks .8 1 1 .1 0
Kirgiz
H00• .0
Latvians . 0 1 .1 0
Estonians • 00 H 1 .1 0
Others 4.03 .0
SOURCE: Joseph P. Mastro, ”The Soviet Political Elite”
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972)5 
p. 79-
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TABLE 3-16
AGE OF FULL MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Age 1956 - % 1961 - % 1966 -%
To 35 0 2 .8 6 1.03
36-40 3 .0 1 1.71 2.56
41-45 9-77 12.57 3 .0 8
46-50 38.35 20.57 14.87
51-55 2.8.57 32.57 26.67
5 6 -6 0 9.77 2 0 .0 3 0 .2 6
6 1 -6 5 5 .2 6 6.29 13.85
Over 66 3 -0 1 3-43 7-69
SOURCE: Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972),
p. 1 2 2.
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TABLE 3-17
AVERAGE AND MEDIAN AGE IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Year 1956 1961 1966 1976
Average
Median
51
^6 -5 0
52
51-55
56
5 6 -6 0
60
SOURCE: Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite" (un­
published Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), 
p. 125 • Jerry F. Hough, "The Brezhnev Era", Problems of Communism 
(April, 1976), p. h.
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age within a twenty year period. With the turnover rate of the older
top Party elite being very low and the turnover rate of Central
Committee membership low (in 1971» 63-9 percent of the 1966 Committee
were re-elected, and in 1976, 89 percent of the 1971 Committee 
20were), the dominance of the older generation over this body seems
assured for at least the next five years.
Achieving Central Committee membership is not an easy task.
Twenty years has been the usual apprenticeship period before becoming
a member. In 19711 for new members, the period extended to twenty- 
21five years. With the age of entrance into the Party increasing, the
age at which future generations will be able to achieve membership will
be at least forty-five years. To further support the continuation of
this generational control, new members that are chosen are similar,
statistically, to the demoted or deceased member. As an example, if a
Central Committee member who had joined the Party in 1932-3^ - at the age
of twenty-six would leave, he would be replaced by one who joined the
Party between 1930 and 19^1 at the age of twenty-six; the longer the
doors are closed to post Stalin elite, the greater the possibility of
22a generational conflict among the Party elite.
The existence of a Slavic core elite within the Central Committee 
hints to where the real power lies (refer to Appendix C). This group 
controlled the Committee from 1936-1971- They were members who had 
served on the Committee for at least four terms. Of the group serving
20Jerry Hough, "The Brezhnev Era", Problems of Communism 
(April, 1976), p. 4.
21Joseph P. Mastro, op. cit., p. 292.
22Ibid., p. 278.
four terms, 88 percent ere of Slavic nationality and 30 percent had 
served in five Committees or more. In 19711 the Slavic core lost its 
tight grip on this group as other nationality groups were able to break 
into its ranks. Its representation dropped to 8l percent as the number 
in the core elite enlarged. Several speculations can be made from that 
occurrence. The leadership may have desired more communication and 
linkage with local populations. They may have employed this tactic in 
an attempt to foster a feeling in the population that they do have a 
stake in the system and an impact on decision-making; finally, they may 
have used it as an illustration of the participation mechanisms in 
existence in the Soviet political system. ^
In the Soviet Union, members of the Central Committee possess 
an immense amount of power, prestige and are immuned to public criticism
2kby the general population. They not only have been known to abuse
their status, but at times, have even been known to be fraudulent and
manipulative. Though this topic will be further investigated in
Chapter V, the following illustration shows the possible nature of one
who has achieved Central Committee rank:
When they were choosing a director for the Moscow Institute 
of Sociology, the name of one Grigorii Kvasov was put for­
ward • • • • He was quite unknown in science and a man of 
no principles, but he happened to be an instructor of the
Central Committee and was interested in the position. (An*
instructor has a status equal to that of a raikom secretary 
in the capital.) When Kvasov was an aspirant (MA candidate) 
at Mowcow University in 1963? he began to spread the rumor 
just before defending his dissertation, that he was a distant 
relative of Brezhnev. He supposed, not without reason, that 
this item of information would help him get the dissertation
*
Raikom translates district.
25Ibid., p. 1 0 7-
2kA. Pravdin, op. cit., p. 101.
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through. Of course, there was no truth in it, but some 
people believed him, because both Kvasov and Brezhnev were 
from Moldavia- The rumor, in any case, reached the Central 
Committee, Kvasov was called in (with his degree in his 
pocket) and warned that he should not encourage such rumors, 
Kvasov, who was frightened, tried to claim that he had a 
distant aunt who either knew Brezhnev’s wife's sister, or 
was somehow related to her. The people of the CC decided 
to bring the matter to Brezhnev's notice, Brezhnev was 
indignant . * . but then said; he wanted to see the imposter.
The impudent Kvasov, though by now scared to death, managed 
to produce a favorable impression on Brezhnev. So that 
they gave him a job in the Department of Philosophy of the 
CC. The strange thing was that in the CC, Kvasov's real 
history was soon forgotten, and the story that he was a 
relative of Brezhnev began to circulate again !^ 5
Another tactic of Central Committee members is sophistry. If
for some reason they are not ardent Marxists, but work v/ith others
26who are, they must have the ability to produce a well argued lie. 
Dishonesty often becomes a way of life for these members as well as 
for other Soviet political elite as will be discussed in Chapter V. 
This even extends to acquiring unearned degrees. The portrait of an 
intensely devoted Marxist who has dedicated himself to the Party and 
the state is often not an accurate description of the members of this 
elite Party organ.
Achievement of Central Committee membership designates one as 
a member of the Soviet upper political elite. With subjectivity as 
well as functionality playing a role in the selection of new members, 
the membership in the Committee is tightly controlled. The average 
member is over 50' years old with a high level of education. He is of 
Slavic origin and has been a Party member for at least twenty years.
2^Ibid., p. 1 0 0.
26Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, op. cit., p. 12*f0.
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His professional position lies either in the Party or State apparatus
which places him in the upper stratum of Soviet society. He is most
likely a veteran of one or two Committees. In aggregate terms, the
Central Committees of the past decade were more skilled and better
educated than their predecessors; in all probability this shift could
be attributed to the recognized need for more specialists in elite
Party positions, resulting from the changed nature of the Soviet
2 7
political system in the recent years.
Summary
The members of the Council of Ministers and Central Committee are 
regarded as the upper political elite in Soviet society. They are highly 
educated, especially in the technical areas, though it is possible that 
some degrees were not earned honestly. They are dominantly of the 
Russian nationality. They are members of the older generation and the 
trends indicate that this will continue. They are both groups of pro­
fessionals, the Council of Ministers by mere fact of their positions in 
the state hierarchy and the Centra]. Committee through occupational repre­
sentation. In neither group is there presently much worker or peasant 
representation, though the social origins of many members of the Council 
of Ministers lie in these classes. Members of these political organi­
zations enjoy status, power, privileges, and similar rank in Soviet 
society, making these bodies ones in which membership is highly sought.
27Joseph Mastro, op. cit., p. 183.
CHAPTER IV
PRESIDIUMS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND SUPREME 
SOVIET/POLITBURO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTI 
The Presidiums of the Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet 
and the Politburo of the CPSU, the highest political institutions in 
the Soviet Union, have positional similarity within their respective 
hierarchies, each holds status and rank above a larger assembly (see 
Appendix A). However, power is distributed unevenly among these 
elite organizations, making resemblance emanate from only the struc­
tural positions of all three, not from the disbursement of power. 
Membership, though, in each, is highly selective and controlled. 
Members are considered to be the upper to top political elite in the 
Soviet political system.'** Since these organizations are structurally 
comparable, the discussion of them in the same chapter seems justified.
Presidiums of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers
Being organizations of the state, the Presidiums of both the 
Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, in practice, lack in major 
decision-making power. Their power and influence come from the over­
lapping membership of their personnel in the Politburo of the CPSU and 
Central Committee, including their respective chairmen. These are two
**This holds true for all members in the Politburo and the 
Presidium of the Council of Ministers, but with the diverse membership 
in the Presidium of the Supreme as illustrated in Table k-2, it might 
not be true of all of its members.
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top men in the Soviet political system and their presence on these 
Presidiums contributes to these bodies' high regard in Soviet 
politics. Leonid Brezhnev, Politburo member and the General Secre­
tary of the Communist Party, is presently the Chairman of the Presi­
dium of the Supreme Soviet. With the revisions of the 1977 Constitu­
tion, this position carries all chief of state functions and is 
designated by the title, President of the Soviet Union. Alexis 
Kosygin, Politburo member, is the Chairman of the Presidium of the 
Council of Ministers which carries the title, Premier of the Soviet 
Union. Party elite officials, so intertwined in the state apparatus, 
continue to demonstrate the dominance and control of the Party over 
all state affairs.
To understand further these execut5.ve organs, a discussion of 
their functions and a description of their membership will be presented. 
Statistical data on their personnel is not obtainable. Since in actual 
practice, the power of these Presidiums and at times, their existence, 
is in question, statistical studies of the individuals holding membership 
in them have not been done. In describing the type of person who might 
belong to one of these bodies, information and trends will have to be 
taken from the summaries of Chapters II and III.
Both organizations have the functions of administration and 
legislation while their respective plenums are not in session. The 
Presidium of the Council of Ministers in the "inner cabinet" of the 
Council of Ministers. It is the pinnacle of the state bureaucracy.
Table 4-1 describes its members who are selected by Party leaders and 
approved by the Supreme Soviet. With a 17-30 percent representation 
from the Politburo (see Table 4-2), and from Table 4-3 an 86-100 percent
TABLE 4-1
MEMBERSHIP REPRESENTATION ON PRESIDIUMS OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Presidium of the Council of Ministers
No. of Members - 14-
Description - Chairman
Two Deputy First Chairmen 
Eleven Deputy Chairmen
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
No. of Members - 39
Description - Chairman
First Vice Chairman 
Fifteen Vice Chairmen 
Secretary
Other Members
High Party Officials
Women
Workers
Peasants
Politburo Members
SOURCE: John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York:
Harper 8c Row, 1978), p. 186. "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of 
Foreign Government", CIA Reference Aid, 1977» P- &9-
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TABLE 4-2
POLITBURO REPRESENTATION ON PRESIDIUMS OF THE SUPREME
SOVIET AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Year Number in Politburo Presidium Membership - %
Presidium of the Counci3. of Ministers
1964 3 (f) 0 (c) 30
1968 O
\-/O 23
1977 2 (f) 0 (c) 17
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
1962 3 (f) 2 (c) 18
1966 3 (f) 2 (c) 14
1970 3 (f) 2 (c) 18
SOURCE: Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), 
p. 368. "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments", 
C.I.A. Reference Aid, 1977* p- 69-
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TABLE k~3
PROPORTION OF PRESIDIUMS MEMBERSHIP
ON PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Presidium Year No. on C.C. Percent
Supreme Soviet 1962 Ik (f) 5 (c) 38
1966 18 5 6k
1970 17 6 6k
Council of 
Ministers 1 968 12 (f) 0 (c) 100
1976 12 0 (c) 2 unknown 86
SOURCE: Peter Vaiineman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), 
p. 368. Edward L. Crowley, et al, eds., Prominent Personalities in the 
USSR (Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1 9 6 8).
8l
TABLE k-b
SOURCES OF MEMBERSHIP FOR PRESIDIUMS OF SUPREME 
SOVIET AMD COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Party State
Politburo 
Central Committee 
Secretariat
Republic Party Officials*
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
Politburo 
Secretariat 
Central Committee 
Supreme Soviet Deputies 
Local Officials 
Local Party Officials
Presidium of S.S.
Presidium of C* of M.
Supreme Soviet^
&Republic Government Official^.
Presidium of the Council of Min
Politburo 
Secretariat 
Central Committee 
Supreme Soviet Deputies 
Local Government Officials
NOTE: The same people do not sit on both Presidiums of the Council of
Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet*
SOURCE: Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), 
pp. 317-318.
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representation in the Central Committee, the Party control of the 
operations of this body is evident. The Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet, the plural executive of that body, is given its elite status 
by the presence of Brezhnev as its chairman, but its executive and 
legislative status by the 1977 Constitution. Its membership is 
described in Table *f-l, with Politburo representation as high as 18 
percent, described in Table b-2.. Party domination is further assured 
by up to 6b percent of its membership sitting on the Central Committee 
(see Table b-3) • In accordance with state statutes, membership in 
these organizations can absolutely not overlap (see Table b-b). Both 
of these organizations represent different branches of the Supreme 
Sovieti Overlapping membership could create a government group which 
could challenge the pov/er of the Party elite.
The specific responsibilities of the Presidium of the Council
of Ministers is to direct the Council’s work, determine its organization
and composition, exercise a special role in economic matters, and issue
2regulations; frequently, it acts in the name of the entire Council.
The chairman is nominally the head of the government apparatus. Unless 
he is General Secretary of the CPSU (an impossibility since the fall of 
Khrushchev), his tenure in office or position in the Politburo may not 
be secure. However, if Party leadership falters, the position could be 
the basis for a power play, as this Presidium consists of a very
John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper &
Row, 1978), p. 190.
Robert Wesson, "Brezhnev’s Year", Current History (October,
1977) > P- 111. To quote from the article, "Hence, in the general ac­
ceptance of collective leadership after Khrushchev was toppled, it was 
agreed among the oligarchs and ratified by the Central Committee that 
no one should combine the leading secretaryship and premiership."
close-knit group of professionals. Aware of this potential threat, 
General Secretary Brezhnev has a habit of addressing the Presidium or 
entire council frequently. The turnover rate of this body is very low 
(see Table 4-5). From 1968 to 1977 > nine years, the turnover rate was 
only 29 percent. Out of nineteen members serving between October 1964
4and March 19751 twelve still belonged as of the latter date. This was
also true of the Presidium of 1977- This continues to illustrate the
closeness, technical skill, and longevity of government ministers.
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is the legislative authority
during the intervals between the Supreme Soviet sessions. It can issue
decrees or ordinances on any matter, including taxation, economic policy,
organization of industry, agriculture, transportation, and law enforce- 
5
ment. It also shares executive responsibility with the Council of 
Ministers, having such executive tasks as convening and dissolving the 
Supreme Soviet, granting awards and decorations, releasing or appointing 
members of the Council of Ministers, declaring a state of war, proclaim­
ing martial law, and appointing or removing the high command of the army. 
Its membership, elected by a joint session of both Supreme Soviet chamber 
is rather diverse as is illustrated in Table 4-1, and does include women,
*
Women do not normally belong to top elite organizations of the 
Party or state at the All-Union level. They have often been regarded as 
politically inferior in Soviet politics. That they might hold membership 
on this Presidium is therefore very unusual.
Grey Hodnett, ’’Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union”, 
Problems of Communism, March-April, 1975 s P- 7*
tz
John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 124.
^Peter Vanneman, ’’The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 321.
TABLE 4-5
MEMBERSHIP IN PRESIDIUM OF THE COUNCIL 
OF MINISTERS TURNOVER RATE
Name 1964 1968 1975 19 77
A. Kosygin X X X X
K. Mazurov - X X X
D. Polyanskiy X X - -
N. Baybakov - X - -
V. Dymshits X X X X
V* Kirillin - X X X
M. Lesechko X X X X
V. Novikov X X X X
I. Novikov - X X X
L. Smirnov X X X X
N. Tikhonov - X X X
M. Yefremov - X - -
I. Arkipov “ - X X
K. Katushev - - - X
N. Martynov - - - X
Z. Nuriyev - “ X X
B. Lomako X - - -
N. Rudnev X - - -
A. Shelepin X - -
D. Ustinov X - - -
P. Shelest - - - “
Percentages of 1977 Membership: 3 6% remained 
71$ remained 
86% remained
from 1964 
from 1968  
from 1975
membership
membership
membership
SOURCE: Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviert
Union", Problems of Communism, March-April, 1975? P- 7- "Chiefs of State 
and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments", CIA Reference Aid, 1977?
P. 6 9.
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lower class workers and peasants. Due to the type of membership in this
body, the turnover rate is very high. Tenure is only assured for the
highest political figures. Since personnel from the Politburo and Central
Committee have increased in the Presidium*s membership, its authority has
increased and it along with the Supreme Soviet has become the chief
7'legalizing instrument of the Party.
The Soviet politician of these elite government bodies is highly 
educated and in most cases, technically skilled, possibly excluding the 
token representation of peasants and workers. He is a Party member with 
most likely Central Committee membership. He more than likely holds a 
white collar position and at present, is regarded as a member of the 
upper political elite in the Soviet Union. If he is not a member of the 
Politburo, he still may have the opportunity to influence decisions or 
legislation. In recent years, the status of these organizations has 
increased and this has, in turn, affected the status of their members. 
Though the Council of Ministers and its Presidium are by law subordinate 
to both the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, the practicing relationship 
of these bodies is inversely related to their legal status as organs of
g
the state. A politician of the former Presidium therefore possesses a 
little more power and influence than one of the latter.
The Politburo
The pinnacle both in status and power in the Soviet political 
system is the Politburo of the CPSU. All major decisions and policy-making 
originate from it. The Central Committee, the Party Congress, and all
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
8?
organizations of the state, in practice, are subordinate to it. 
Membership is limited and recruitment is subjective. Though its stated 
work is to direct the activities of the Central Committee when it is 
not in session, in actuality, the Politburo is the controller, policy­
maker, and major decision-maker of the entire Soviet political system.
Although it is known that decisions and policy come from the
Politburo, little is known about how it operates, for sessions are held
in secret and no minutes are published. The frequency of its meetings
is even in dispute. In 1971 and 1973i Brezhnev is reported to have
declared that it met on Thursdays, at 3^00 in the afternoon. Later, he
9
toldthe 23th Congress that it met forty-three times a year. It is 
known, however, that all decisions are made collectively under the 
presence of a dominant personality (Brezhnev’s at present). Though 
they are reported as unanimous, it is generally known that many times 
dissension within the body has occurred.
As its power has increased, the Politburo has seemed to become 
involved in political games. Size and longevity of its membership have 
played very significant roles in this. Since the 1930’s, the number in 
the Politburo (at times called the Presidium) has varied (see Table b-6 ). 
Though no definite trend is evident, several politically relevant obser­
vations can be made. In 1939? the membership was reduced to the lowest 
in this forty-six year period. Possible explanations for this could be 
Stalin’s mistrust of many of his colleagues or just the lack of qualified 
personnel, since the purges had ended in 1938. In 1932, during the tense 
time in Kremlin circles of the ’doctor’s plot’, the enlarging of the
^John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 12*f.
TABLE k-6
MEMBERSHIP IN THE POLITBURO
Year Full Members Candidate Members
1930 10 5
193^ 10 5
1939 9 2
19^6 11 k
1932 25 11
1936 11 6
1957 15 9
1961 11 5
1966 11 8
1971 15 6
1976 (beginning) 15 7
1976 (end) 16 6
19 77 8
SOURCE: Wasyl Kalynowych, ’’The Top Elite of the Communist Party
of the USSR in 1919-1971” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana 
University, 1972), p. 206. Richard F. Staar, ed., Yearbook on Inter­
national Communist Affairs, 1975* 1976, 1977 (Stanford, California: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1975? 1976, 1977), pp* 8l, 69, 96.
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Politburo has been related to an attempt to cover up the annihilation 
of old Politburo members due to Stalin’s paranoia.^ Though decreased 
in 1956, 1957 brought another increase. This was the time of 
Khrushchev’s conflict with the "anti-party" group and his attempt to 
recruit his supporters for Politburo positions.^ In the sixties,
membership decreased, but in 1971? again it was expanded, with Brezhnev
* 12 bringing in four of his clients as Politburo members. The changing
size of the Politburo can be said to have had significance in the
political maneuvering which has occurred in the Politburo through the
years•
The longevity of membership in recent years has also seemed to 
play a role in Politburo politics (refer to Appendix D). In 1977? 33 
percent of the members have served thirteen years since the fall of 
Khrushchev in 19&4; 13 percent more had served since 19&7? totalling 
46 percent of the 1977 membership having served since 19&7- Of the 
other 53 percent, 27 percent were members from 1971 and 26 percent, on 
the body for one year or less. A political speculation can be drawn
In the patronage system which is prevalent in Soviet politics, 
as will be discussed in Chapter V, a client is a supporter of one who 
is politically high in rank and power. The latter is labeled a patron.
^Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Puled (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1 9 6 5)? PP* 446-447* The doctor's plot was an affair 
in which allegedly doctors assigned to the Kremlin had, through incor­
rect diagnosis and improper treatment murdered two top officials and had 
conspired with enemy states to undermine the health of leading military 
and Kremlin officials. Others felt that it was the pre-eminance of 
another purge by Stalin. However, Stalin died suddenly and the purge 
was averted.
"^‘Tiiomas H. Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership", Soviet Studies 
(October, 1970)» P* 171*
12Myron Rush, "Brezhnev and the Succession Issue", Problems of 
Communism (July-August, 1971)* P* 12.
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from these figures. Before 1971? 60 percent of the 1964 Politburo were
still on the body. Yet, after 1971^ this majority dropped. During the
former period, Brezhnev's influence and power were uncertain, but since
the 1 9 7 0's, they have both grown, along with the number of known sup-
13porters of his on the Politburo. Even the pinnacle of the Soviet 
political system is not free from the manipulative games of politics.
To analyze the type of person who might achieve membership, the 
full members of the 1979-76 Politburo will be studied. Though Marshal 
Greckho died in 1976 and Poliansky was eventually demoted, at the begin­
ning of 1976 both held membership and therefore, will be included in the 
sample. Table 4-7 is the data from which most of the remaining percent­
ages will be derived.
In discussing age in the Politburo, the previous assertion that 
the older generation rules the Soviet Union is overwhelmingly supported. 
If fifteen years is taken to denote a generation, then two generations 
are represented on this Politburo, the 90-69 one with seven representa­
tives and the 66-8l one with eight representatives, with the average age 
being 67 years. As Table 4-8 shows, this average age has not always been 
so high. Yet, with its steady climb since 1992 (excluding the slight 
decrease from 1961 to 1 9 6 6), a generational preference seems evident. 
Supporting this is that despite the large turnover rate in the 1 9 7 0's 
the new members were of the same or older generation as their demoted 
predecessors. The older e l i t e  of the Politburo jealously guards its 
position of leadership, reluctant to allow even a minor break through 
from younger Party executives.
15Ibid.
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TABLE 4-8
AVERAGE AGE OF POLITBURO MEMBERSHIP 
(Including Candidate Members)
1952 1956 1961 1966 1976
59-8 59-9 61.4 60.4 6 5.O
SOURCE: Joseph Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 125•
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Another aspect dealing with the generational situation in the 
Soviet political elite is the orientation conflict of the old compared 
to the younger executives. All of the sample Politburo members were 
born between 1899 and 1920, reaching maturity in the twenties and 
thirties and entering the Party, on the average, around 1931- This 
indicates a Stalinist orientation plus a keen awareness of the intrica­
cies of Soviet politics since the majority of them survived the chaotic 
l*fthirties. By comparison, the majority of present party members and
the present Soviet population was not born until after 1930. These are
people who reached maturity after Stalin’s death. Their perspective on
life and politics is more likely to be colored by the impact of de~
stalinization as opposed to the years of purges, the continued sacrifice
15and the presence of terror. The difference between the old and young
is more than just age. Even the 1976-77 changes in the full membership
of the Politburo did not alter appreciably the orientation of the
Politburo personnel. Grigori Romanov, and Dimitri Ustinov were promoted
*
to take the places of Podgorney, Polyiansky, and Grechko. Both were
born between 1900 and 1922. The older elite seem to be resisting as
long as possible the turning over of power to the post-Stalin generation
not only because they like to hold power, but also because they distrust
l6those who have not passed through the trials they underwent.
*
When Podgorny was ’’retired” in 1977» his position in the 
Politburo was not replaced, dropping its full membership from 13 to 1^1-, 
though later two were promoted to candidate membership, expanding that 
to eight.
Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite” (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 123«
1 5Ibid., p. 1 2 3-
■^Robert Wesson, op. cit., p. 133-
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Educational training of the 1976 Politburo is higher than 
might be expected for men of their age in the Soviet Union (see Table 
4-7)* During the twenties and thirties, with the emphasis on indus­
trialization and a successful agricultural policy, many institutes of 
learning in these fields were founded in the Soviet Union. 'This 
accounts for their training, but Khrushchev’s efforts, in part, account 
for them being in the Politburo. In the latter 1950’s Khrushchev
attempted to bring specialists and technocrats into Party career elite
17positions within the Party apparatus. Though unpopular then, it has 
become the rule in the upper Party organs today. Not only do 87 percent 
of the sample have college or institute training, but 6 7 percent have 
specialities in engineering, agriculture, or technology. Only two or 
13 percent have just a secondary education with Party School training, 
with two also being the number of traditional Party careerists in the 
body. Out of the fifteen full members, only four had any type of Party 
School training (refer to Table 4-7)• The emphasis on education and 
technical training seems to have become one of the determinants in 
Politburo membership.
As has been shown for other bodies, the Slavic nationalities 
dominate the Politburo. The Russians, in 1976, accounted for 64 percent 
of the membership and the Ukrainians, for 14 percent (see Table 4-9)*
The interesting trend shown by that Table is the gross increase in 
Russian representation at the expense of Ukrainian and Georgian repre­
sentation and an overrepresentation of the Belorrussians. A possible
17George Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered”, Problems of 
Communism, September-October, 1976, p. 26.
TABLE h-3
PERCENTILE COMPARISON OF TEE UNION REPUBLICST 
POPULATION AND POLITBURO MEMBERSHIP 
(including Candidates Members)
Union Republic Population
1970
Politburo Membership 
1966 1971 1976
Russian 33-8 52.if 6k.O
Ukrainian 19.3 2 1 .0 1 9 -0 lif.O
Kazakh 3.3 3-3 if. 8 if.6
Uzbek 4.9 3-3 if. 8 if.6
Belorussian 3-7 10.5 9-5 9-1
Georgian 1-9 5-3 if. 8 .0
Latvian .9 3-3 if.8 if. 8
SOURCE: V/asyl Kalynowych, "The Top Elite of the Communist Party
of the USSR in 1919”1971H (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana 
University, 1972), p. 250.
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explanation could be Brezhnev's growing power and desire to recruit 
Russians like himself for membership in order to expand his influence.
The fluctuation of the Kazakh, Uzbek, Belorussian, and Latvian per­
centages can be explained by the expansion of the Politburo membership 
in 1971 and 197&, but the decrease of Ukrainian and Georgian percentages 
indicate a definite decrease in membership. The control of all state 
and Party bodies by the Slavic nationalities implies their importance 
in the Soviet Union today.
In discussing the social class origins of the Politburo member­
ship, the origin of their fathers does not represent the status of these 
political elite today. These men represent the peak of Soviet society, 
the upper stratum of elite, with all the privileges and benefits that 
society can bestow upon them. (To be further discussed in Chapter V) 
Their origins, on the other hand, are what would be expected of men born 
between 1899 and 1920 (refer to Table 4-7')- This was the pre- and post- 
revolutionary times when the two major social groups in the Soviet Union 
were workers and peasants. Therefore, a 33 percent worker representation, 
a bO percent peasant representation, and a 13 percent white collar repre­
sentation does not seem unusual. These facts could also testify that 
the Soviet regime of the past favored working and peasant classes. This
may not be true in the future, however, as it is the children of the 
* *
middle and upper classes in the Soviet Union at present who have the
*
In his dissertation, Wasyl Kalynowych defines the middle class 
as factory workers, teachers, and local Party bureaucrats. He defines 
upper class as high government and Party officials and military and 
scientific officials.
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educational and political opportunities which, in turn, could help
l8them inherit the leadership of the Soviet Union,
To analyze Politburo membership, Party-related characteristics
and career type must be discussed. In 1978, it had taken an average
of thirty-three years of Party membership before full membership in the
Politburo was achieved. With the average age of Party entrance rising
above twenty-six years, and the wait for Politburo membership being as
many as thirty-five to fifty years, youth in the Party can expect a
long wait before securing a Politburo position. With 80 percent of the
1976 members having held candidate Politburo status, this may help to
achieve full membership, but not necessarily shorten the long wait for
it. The length of candidature for the sample Politburo ranged from one
year nine months to seven years nine months, with the average being four
years five months. Though four members were coopted into membership
without candidate status, their previous positions and experiences could
account for this. Pelshe, a Party member since the Revolution, and one
of the few eligible candidates to replace the old Bolshevik Shvernik,
was a respected Party careerist; Grechko held the post of Marshall of the
Soviet Union; Gromyko was well-known in the foreign field; and Kulakov
was a member of the Party Secretariat. Also, all four were known as
19Brezhnev supporters. Longevity in Party membership and Politburo
18Wasyl Kalynowych, ’’The Top Elite of the Communist Party of the 
USSR in I9 19-I9 7I” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 
1972), pp. 369-370.
19Patronage relationships will be discussed in Chapter V. By 
way of contrast, Dimitri Ustinov held candidate status for eleven years 
before being promoted to full membership in 1977- Originally, he had 
not been considered a Brezhnev supporter.
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candidature seem to be two important characteristics in achieving full 
Politburo membership.
Career type also plays a role in achieving full membership in 
this top elite body. Table 4-10 gives career lines of Politburo members 
from 1953 to 1 9 6 6. The dominance of Republic or Oblast First Secretary 
status with candidature indicates the importance that the top elite puts 
on Republic or Oblast party elite experience in qualifying for Politburo 
membership. The number coopted from the Party Secretariat, without 
candidature, implies the importance of holding that position. Looking at 
the 1976 sample and their penultimate positions, of those with candida­
ture, 73 percent held Party elite positions while 27 percent held govern­
ment elite positions. Of those without candidature, careers were split 
between Party and government elite positions. Though elite Party posi­
tions continue to dominate the career paths of Politburo personnel, an
interesting aspect appears if a comparison is made between the penulti-
*
mate positions of the 1976 Politburo and their present positions (refer 
to Table 4-11). In their current positions, 55 percent hold, elite Party 
positions and 45 percent elite government, an increase of 18 percentage 
points for the government elite. In the case of those without candidate 
status, the percentages remain the same. The conclusion that can be 
drawn from this material states that Politburo membership can contribute 
to ones cooptation into government elite positions whereas a Party elite 
career is the best background in achieving Politburo membership.
*
Present refers to the positions held by the 1976 Politburo at 
the beginning of that year.
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TABLE h-11
POSITIONS OF THE 1976 POLITBURO
Member
*
Penultimate Position
**
Present Position
L. Brezhnev C. C. Secretary General Secretary
A. Kosygin USSR Min. - Gosplan Chr. USSR Ministers
N. Podgorney Ukrainian Presidium (Party) Chr. of Supreme Sov.
M. Suslov C. C. Secretary Same
A. Kirilenko First Sec. Sverdlosk Oblast C. C. Secretary
K. Mazuro First Sec. Belorussia First Dept. C. of M.
D. Poliansky Min. in RSFSR C. of M. Minister of Agri.
V. Grishin First Sec. Moscow City Org. Same
D. Kunaev First Sec. Kazakh Same
V. Sheherbitsky Ukraine Presidium (Party) First Sec. Ukraine
Y. Andropov Chr. State Security Same
All the above had candidature
A. Pelshe Latvian Presidium (Party) Chr. of Party Control <
F. Kulakov C. C. Secretary Same
A. Grechko USSR Min. - Defense Same
A. Gromyko Min. of Foreign Affairs Same
All the above did not have candidature
Party Officials among members - 8
State Officials among members - 9
Party Officials who moved to
state positions - 2
*
Penultimate position means the last position held before gaining full 
Politburo membership.
Present position means position held at the beginning of 1976.
SOURCE: Richard F. Staar, ed., Yearbook on International
Communist Affairs, 1976 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution
Press, 1976), p. 69« Edward L. Crowley, et al, eds., Prominent Per­
sonalities in the USSR (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1968).
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The Politburo of the CPSU is a fascinating subject. Its 
adaptability to new trends has improved the quality of its membership, 
yet, conservatism, politics, and its self-perpetuating character has 
kept it controlled by a generational elite that jealousy guards its 
power. The politician of the Politburo is a man in his late fifties 
or sixties, with a degree in the technical fields. He has devoted 
much of his life to the advancement of his Party career, though he may 
hold a government elite position. His elite career is post-Stalin, 
but his orientation is Stalinist. By nationality, he is Russian; by 
origin, from the lower classes, but at present, he is a member Of the 
highest elite of his country. He has held candidate status and opts 
for one of his own generation to fill a vacancy in membership. Achiev­
ing full Politburo membership takes ambition, fortitude, Party experi­
ence, and an early entrance into a Party career. The 1976 members seem 
to possess all of these characteristics.
Summary
From a comparison between memberships of the Presidiums of the 
Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers and of the Politburo of the 
CPSU, an interesting picture can be gained of the people who belong to 
these top political bodies. Most are men who belong to the older genera­
tion and the Slavic nationality. They are highly educated with a social
status. All belong to the Communist Party and most sit on the Central
{
Committee. Overlapping membership between the Politburo and Presidiums 
accounts for 39 percent of the Presidiums’ memberships. This further 
supports the assertion that the Party desires to control and direct all 
the affairs of the state. The turnover rate of all three contrasts
103
greatly, but that of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and the 
Politburo presents an insight into the difference between the state and 
Party elite. From 1 9 6 7 -6 8 to 19771 the rate of turnover on the Presidium 
was 29 percent while on the Politburo, it was 33 percent. An explana­
tion put forth could be the existence of political tactics or games 
entering into the recruitment of the latter, while competence and skill 
are the major factors of recruiting the former. As the overlapping 
membership and other factors of the memberships of the Politburo and two 
Presidiums indicate, the real center of power in the Soviet political 
system lies in the Politburo of the Communist Party.
CHAPTER V
THE HUMAN ELEMENT 
This chapter deviates from the methodology of the previous 
three by presenting a narrative discussion rather than statistical 
data in analyzing the Soviet political elite. It is included in 
order to more fully develop the subject of this thesis. An inherent 
problem in any type of research, especially prevalent in Soviet studies, 
is the impossibility of completely covering sensitive subject areas due 
to the lack of total information on the subject, the inability to obtain 
needed material, or the bias of sources. Despite these drawbacks, a 
clearer picture of this elite group will be created, if along with the 
demographic characteristics, the human side, the actions and motives of 
this group, are mentioned. Concepts widely held about Soviet politi­
cians which are incorporated in the major and minor hypotheses presented 
in Chapter I will be investigated in this chapter. Three sub-headings 
will be used in analyzing this human element-— Patronage, Tactics, and 
Elitism and Corruption. Not only will the intricacies of the Soviet 
political system become more apparent through this chapter, but also a 
realistic understanding of the Soviet political elite will be completed.
Patronage
Patronage is not unique to the Soviet Union. With the oligarchic 
and centralist nature of the Soviet government, however, the effects of 
the practice may be more profound in its political system. Patronage in
10*f
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the Soviet system refers to the relationship between two individuals,
sharing special ties and assuming such roles in the system that are
conducive to each others' political careers.^ Many theories about
Soviet politics interpret patronage not only as a principal factor
in a leader's rise to power, but also as having a continuous effect
upon a leader's capacity to maintain his power and secure the fulfill-
ment of his programmatic commitments. If a higher Party official is
in the position to influence the appointment of members of his Party
organization or a lower one, he will invariably recommend people upon
3
whom he can rely for support. The move, in the late fifties, to 
remove Nikita Khrushchev from the Politburo, might have been successful 
had Khrushchev not had the foresight to use his influence in the re­
cruitments of cadres for the positions of Central Committee membership. 
While there is little evidence that he exercised much influence over 
All Union government appointments, his role was dominant in effecting 
changes among Party and government officials of the republics, who
If
betv/een them, make up over half of the Central Committee membership.
Qf the 133 full members on the Central Committee in 1956, fifty-six of 
them were officials whose careers had been fostered by Khrushchev and
■^Xizhanatham A. Jagannathan, "The Political Recruitment and 
Career Patterns of Obkom, First Secretaries from 1952-1969" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971)? p- 332.
2
Philip Stewart and others, "Political Mobility - Soviet Politi­
cal Process", American Political Science Review (December, 1972), p. 1270.
3
Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan, op. cit., p. 332.
If
Thomas H. Rigby, "How Strong is the Leader", Problems of 
Communism, September-October, 1962, p. 3-
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5
some twenty others had similar relationships with Khrushchev, This 
fact also contributed to the passage of Khrushchev-sponsored resolu­
tions, concerning raising the level of agriculture and consumer produc­
tion, at that time. Leonid Brezhnev has also proven to be adept at the 
use of patronage for his own benefit. As Chapter IV brought out, with 
the increase of Brezhnev clients on the Politburo in the 1970's, his 
power has increased accordingly. For the Soviet political elite, 
patronage is a practice fervently and widely followed in order to 
enhance their career potential.
Patronage is also advantageous to the client, who often is a 
man of power or represents real political and organizational interests. 
Both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev owe their political success 
to such a relationship, the former to Stalin, the latter to Khrushchev 
himself. In i9 6 0, Leonid Brezhnev, a Politburo member and Central
Committee Secretary was 'promoted* to the status of Chairman of the
*
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, losing his Secretaryship. Frol Kozlov,
a Khrushchev client, became heir apparent. In 196^ -, health forced
Kozlov's retirement. Brezhnev, a Khrushchev supporter, regained his
status as a Central Committee Secretary. After his reinstatement, he
took part in Khrushchev's ouster of 196*+, though he refused to give the
speech to the Central Committee that removed his former patron from 
7
office.
*
At that date, this position was neither important nor powerful, 
but rather, ceremonial.
5Ibid.
£
Philip Stewart and others, op. cit., p. 1270.
7
Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev - The Years 
in Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 176. John
Dornberg, Brezhnev (New York: Basic Books, 197*0 j P- 16.
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Vasily Mzhavanadze, a Politburo candidate member until 1972 
became the ’tool* of his client, Otari Lazishvili, known as the "Soviet
g
version of the Godfather." Lazishvili made full use of his relation­
ship and often boasted to his friends that he could arrange the hiring 
and firing of any Republican minister or Party official for the City 
of Tbilisi or Republic of Georgia. The year 1972 brought Lazishvilirs
9
arrest and conviction and Mzhavandze's ’retirement' from the Politburo.
A patronage relationship can often backfire.
Young Party officials make every effort to secure a patron from 
among the rising or present Party elite. The status of client can mean 
faster achievement of goals or a preferred positional change. Table 9-1 
illustrates known patronage relationships. (Note similarity between the 
movement of some patrons and clients.) Such ties usually begin in the 
early part of an official's career. Some characteristics which help in 
the establishment of these ties are among the following:
1. Common background or nationality tie
2. Contemporaneous attendance in the same educational 
institution ^
3- Association through work in the same place.
The real rulers of the country, the officials of the Communist
Party, are promoted, in the majority of instances, through the use of
patronage and pleasing their superiors, not by winning the votes of the
11public or their peers. Among Party officials, especially younger ones,
g
Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle/The New York
Times Book Co., 1976), p. 97»
9Ibid.
^Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan, op. cit., p. 333*
"^Robert G. Kaiser, Russia (New York: Atheneura, 1976), p. 133-
TABLE 5-1
PATRONAGE RELATIONSHIPS 
(Several Examples)
Client Patron Remarks
N. I. Zhurin L. Brezhnev Brezhnev lost membership in
C. C. Secretariat in i9 6 0, 
Zhurin lost C. C. membership 
in I9 6I. Brezhnev returned 
to position in 1964, Zhurin 
to C. C. in 1966.
D. S. Polianskii A. I. Kirichenko Kirichenko was a Politburo
member from 193 3-1 9 6 0, 
Politanskii gained a Council 
of Ministers position in i9 6 0.
A. I.' Adzhubey N. Khrushchev Khrushchev was First Secre­
tary from early fifties in 
1963*> A. I. Adzhubey held 
the editorship of Izvestiya 
and was youngest member of 
C. C. until 1964.
G. T. Stuysky N. Khrushchev Khrushchev was Firse Secretary
from early fifties to 1964, 
and a Ukranian. Stuysky, a 
Ukranian, was personal sec. 
to K. and member of Party 
Auditing Commission in 1 9 6 1. 
Both lost positions in 1964.
N. A. Kuznetsov L. Brezhnev Brezhnev was Dept, to RSFSR
Supr. Sov. at 1963 and 1967  
convoc. as was Kuznetsov. 
Brezhnev, First Sec. of CPSU 
from 1964 to present.
Kuznetsov became, his deputy 
and a candidate member of 
CPSU in 1977 .
SOURCE: Kizhanatham Athinathan Jagannathan, "The Political Re­
cruitment and Career Patterns of Obkom First Secretaries from 1932-1969” 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971), PP- 
342-348.
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this is a sensitive point; they have to admit that no one ever voted to
give them their power and privileges, but both came down to them from 
12above. Whereas many of the individuals who hold elite Party positions
are well qualified, many are not, achieving their status and privilege
through the patronage system. Roy Medvedev, a dissident historian,
describes the topic in the following way:
The alarming thing is that advancement is largely dependent on 
personal patronage, on friendships, or family connections— poli­
tical and professional qualifications are secondary. How else 
can one explain the fact that a man who invariably is the subject 
of scorn and ridicule in the scientific circles has for seven 
years been head of the science section of the Central Committee?
• . . .  A senior party official who has been 'working in Minsk 
finds jobs in Moscow for those who assisted him in Belorussia, 
while a different leader, who was in Moldavia, assiduously 
pushes his colleagues from Kishinev up the administrative ladder.
In this way, extraordinary 'spheres of influence' and 'private 
domains' are formed within the apparatus of the government— with 
'one of our boys' in charge. Individuals are often referred to 
as 'so and so's man.'13
Soviet oligarchical rule fosters the attempts by members of the 
upper elite to consolidate- their strength and base support by establishing 
political strongholds, including forming groups or coalitions of support. 
Individuals who reach these high echelons not only possess the power and 
status of their political position, but also possess great persuasive 
power and personal support. Successes and losses of Soviet politicians 
often determines the careers of those v/hom they have helped. The influ­
ence of the patronage system upon the careers of the Soviet political 
elite cannot be minimized; it definitely is the lubricant of the Soviet 
political system.
13
Hoy A. Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy (New York: Alfred
Knopf, 1975), p. 299-
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Tactics
Tactics used in Soviet politics are similar to those in other 
political systems, including those used for political gain. Soviet 
politicians are known to maneuver for positions, edge out one another
from important posts, build networks of allies and supporters, and
1*+ . . .  promote and protect their own careers. Among the top political, elite,
few real friendships exist; competition for power is usually present.
Bending the law to foster their own careers is not only practices, but
also, accepted by the populace. During the Watergate era, the Soviet
political elite would not take the situation seriously, while the
average citizen could not understand why a scandal occurred or Nixon
resigned. Supposedly, moderate realistic Party bureaucrats have been
known to compromise and submerge their own private views in hopes of
moderating policy in a manner similar to the actions of some American
15politicans during the Vietnam War era. Political maneuvering also
occurs when filling many vacancies in the elite Party organizations.
Often the career apparatchik is overlooked in favor of a provincial
leader, for the former possesses too much sophistication and worldi-
l6ness to be fully trusted in top positions. The ones in charge of 
choosing replacements prefer cadres whom they feel they can thoroughly 
rely upon.
In order to further analyze the tactics open to the Soviet 
political elite, those of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev will
1^Robert G. Kaiser, op. cit., p. I6*f.
15Hedrick Smith, op. crt., p. 293- 
l6Ibid.
Ill
be used as examples. Both men achieved the highest position in Soviet
politics. Though their method was similar, their style and tactics
were totally different. Nikita Khrushchev was not considered an
intellectual. Rather, he was the epitome of the self-made Soviet man,
shrewd, earthy, endowed with boundless energy, a bouncy personality,
17and a quick wit. His colleagues regarded him as "hardworking, but
uninspired, weak in political theory, a rather ordinary, sometimes
crude man . . .  who would always pay dutiful attention to his 'betters’
(the more experienced Party leaders).'^ 0 leg Penkovskiy, the Soviet
military elite member turned intelligence agent, called him a liar, a
demagogue, and an adventurer who was quite prepared to begin war if
19circumstances turned favorable for him. Others have said that he 
would have made an excellent collective farm chairman. Nonetheless, 
Nikita Khrushchev rose securely through the Party ranks, gained Stalin's 
confidence, and masterfully used analysis and exploitation of the social 
and political forces at hand, especially rivalries, to squeeze out his 
competition, Malenkov, in particular to become Stalin's heir.
Khrushchev was flamboyant, dynamic, and innovative, often using 
these characteristics to overcome his feelings of inferiority due to his 
master, the evidence now at hand makes it clear that Khrushchev chafed 
under Stalin's restrictions, but at the time no one could match him in 
fulsome tributes to his mentor and none was more zealous in defending
17Merle Fainsod, "Khrushchevism in Retrospect", Problems of 
Communism (January-February, 1965)1 p- 1.
18Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, op. cit., p. 5«
19Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers (New York: Doubleday
& Company, 1965)1 p. 56.
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23Stalin's course. He destalinized the Soviet Union, while at the 
same time, restalinizing it. He declared support, of peaceful co­
existence while forcing a crisis in Berlin, furnishing atomic missiles
2kto Cuba, or sending troops to Hungary. All these contradictions
earned him the reputation as self-willed, unpredictable, and unorthodox.
He was a master at propaganda and admitted this in many speeches. "It
may be said that Nikita Khrushchev is again handing out propaganda. If
you think so, you are not mistaken. Yes, I was, am, and aj.ways shall be
25a propagandist . • . ."
Despite his failures and fall, Nikita Khrushchev knew how to 
assert his dominance, use people and organizations, make use of the 
patronage system, tap grievances, exploit policies, and create confusion 
to achieve success. He was an ingenious politician.
The style of Leonid Brezhnev contrasts with that of his pre­
decessor. He is neither flamboyant nor outgoing, but intelligent, 
reserved, and modest. He is the one who sits back and studies the 
situation before initiating action. At his rise to power, Brezhnev was
described as the true "Soviet manager-politician-executive, the efficient
26organization man, the Communist in the grey-flannel suit." However, 
some of the methods he used to accomplish this rise mirrored those of 
Stalin and Khrushchev. The strategy had three parts; (a) using the post
23Merle Fainsod, op. cit., p. 2.
2kHerman Achminow, "Khrushchev: The Apparatchik Who Fooled the
World", Bulletin: Institute for the Study of the USSR (September, 1971)1
p. 19-
25Merle Fainsod, op. cit., p. 2.
26John Dornberg, op. cit., p. 15.
of senior secretary to gain primacy in the Secretariat of the Central
Committee, (b) using the Secretariat to win control over the party
apparatus throughout the country at large, (c) using the party appara-
27tus to establish dominance over the other institutions of the regime.
In carrying out. these methods, he made extensive use of the patronage
system as did Khrushchev; he too can be considered a master at it.
The tactics of Brezhnev differ from those of his predecessor.
He is cautious, slow to move, and instinctive in achieving his objective.
He knows v/hen to slap a back, shake a hand, promote a supporter, or
28demote an adversary. He is cool, calculating, and cunning, displaying
. the. brilliance of an accomplished, educated politician. Richard Nixon
29once pegged him as the ’’best politician in the room.” Patience and. 
fortitude both describe his action in gaining an objective. To neutral­
ize his opposition in the Politburo after 196^ -, he ingeniously had 
Podgorny removed from the Secretariat and more recently, from the Polit- 
i buro; Shelepin was expelled from the Secretariat and later from Politburo,
at Brezhnev's initiative; he< won over Kirilenko and Suslov, at first
30potentially strong threats to his rise to power. He delayed the 
completion of the new Soviet Constitution until his pov/er base in the 
Politburo was strong enough to support his selection as President of the 
Soviet Union, enchancing both his personal power and prestige. In order 
not to repeat the same mistakes of Khrushchev of constant reorganizations
27Myron Rush, ’’Brezhnev and the Succession Issue”, Problems of 
Communism (July-August, 1971)j p* 11*
20
John Bornberg, op. eit., p. 17-
2 9Ibid., p. 1 7*
30
Myron Rush, op. cit., p. 11.
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and replacements of cadres, he waited five years before moving into the
critical area of appointments to policymaking bodies in the provinces
31and on the All Union level.
Leonid Brezhnev characterizes the quiet, reserved politician.
He stays in the middle, becoming the man upon whom all the interest
groups and the warring and rival lobbies which comprise the Soviet
32establishment can agree. Yet, he knows when it is necessary to be 
open, joke at a party, or tell an anti-Communist joke. Though his 
programs in reorganization of bureaucratic administrations have gone 
slower than desired, he has been able to push through a vigorous land 
reclamation program and reforms in industrial management. Unlike 
Khrushchev, he has achieved comradeliness, trust, and respect from 
people in the Party and has been the object of honest praise from his 
colleagues. Leonid Brezhnev is not the dynamic, gregarious politician, 
but he has been able to ingeniously use analysis, manipulation, and 
patience to arrograte to himself a high degree of personal power which
is fully supported by his colleagues.
The tactics of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, though 
similar by method, vary. While Khrushchev was ready to attack any given 
program and attempt a solution quickly, Brezhnev sits back and waits for 
the correct moment, like a mountain lion stalking his prey. Where 
Khrushchev was gregarious and open, Brezhnev remains quiet and aloof. This
reserved manner makes Brezhnev the more dangerous opponent for his true
feelings are never revealed. Despite the great ideological differences be­
tween the Soviet Union and the Western world, the tactics open to and used by
3 1Ibid., p. 1 2.
32John Dornberg, op. cit., p. 16.
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the Soviet politicial elite do not vary much from those used by their 
colleagues in the West.
Elitism and Corruption
The Soviet Union is an elitist society with a group of people 
who are considered socially above the general population. Though the 
elite of the Soviet Union can be divided into two groups, the intelli- 
gensia and the political elite, the latter, those who hold important 
Party and government All Union positions are the focus of this paper 
and will be the only group considered in this discussion. V/ithin this 
group, strata exist depending upon position and importance, with the 
entire system of privilege being similarly hierarchial. An ambitious
young man working his way up through the ranks of the Party can see
33ahead the privileges he will receive at each level.
The advantages of this elite status range from higher incomes 
and access to special shops to private country homes and special medical 
care. Table 5-2 illustrates the differences in income. Salary levels 
in the Soviet Union are somewhat deceptive, for the power elite (upper 
to top political elite with the exclusion of military) receive other 
prerequisites of power which make their real income almost incalcuable. 
While the military and Party elite seem to dominate the higher pay scale, 
the latter really does. In comparison to the minimum wage and worker’s 
income, a large gap is evident while the rate of pay of a manager puts him 
in a middle range. In writing his article on "Top Incomes in the USSR." 
Mervyn Matthews discusses the problems in acquiring the statistics in 
the table.
33Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 177•
TABLE 5-2
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION
Category Monthly Wage Without Benefits 
(in Rubles)*
Upper Range
Marshall of the Soviet Union 2 ,0 0 0
General Sec® of the CPSU 900
Sec. of Cen. Comm 700 - 800
Union Rep. or Oblast First Sec. 600
Major General .600
Director of Research for C. C. 600
Ambassador or Colonel 500
Middle Range
Coal Manager 48o
Professor - Chief Researcher 325 - 325
Non-Ferrous Manager k20
Other Managers 256 - 390
Collective Farm Chr. 140 - 300
Lower Range
Editor 2h0
Textile Industry Manager 215
Secretary (Private) 190
Researcher l*f0
Worker 130
Jr. Researcher 113
Minimum Wage 60
NOTES: 1. Wages do not include bonuses or secondary benefits.
2. In 1977, Leonid Brezhnev became Marshall of the Soviet
Union, consequently, raising his wage considerably.
3- The varying ranges refer to areas where positions vary
in importance.
SOURCE: Mervyn Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR: Towards a
Definition of the Soviet Elite", Survey (Summer, 1975)? PP- 7-13-
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. . .  Soviet censors have set an upper limit for published 
wage studies . . . .  The highest figures to come to our 
notice in openly published discussion of wages and incomes 
were intervals of 300 to over 400 rubles per month . . .  
this may be provisionally accepted as a rule-of-thumb lower 
limit for elite salaries.
. . .  other pieces of evidence make a figure of ^30 rubles 
for the head of an elite household in the early seventies 
seem reasonable . . . .  A salary of ^50 rubles was about 
seven times the mipimum wage and three and one-half times 
the average wage.^
The difference in wage as described by Mr. Matthews may not be what
they seem, for the existence of secondary benefits for the political
elite drastically changes their income status.
Secondary benefits for these Soviet elites come in several 
categories: confidential monetary payments, restricted goods and
services, and access to special advantages reserved exclusively for 
those of elite status. The first benefit is the "thirteenth month" 
salary, an automatic payment to the top political elite that requires no 
extra effort. The second benefit, "the Kremlin ration", is special 
*goldr rubles worth more than their face value in state run special out­
lets and shops. These come in 16 to 32 denomination which apparently
35indicate two categories of seniority. This benefit reaches nearly all 
elite households. The amount received of either benefit is determined 
by the level and status of the elite member. Those receiving these are 
given access to one, two, or all three types of special shopping. A 
closed distributor handles high quality Soviet and Western goods at low 
prices. Restricted outlets carry quality Soviet goods, unavailable or 
unobtainable in ordinary shops, at only slightly lower prices. Foreign
Mervyn Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR: Towards a Defini­
tion of the Soviet Elite", Survey (Summer, 1973)i p* 7-
35-Ibid., p. 15.
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currency shops have superior Soviet and Western goods, sold well below
normal Soviet prices. None but an elite member with a special pass is
allowed entrance to any one of these. The reaction to these shops by
the average Russian citizen is resentment.
Many Russians are infuriated at the existence of these stores 
which are, in effect, a consumer goods sector where Soviet 
currency is not accepted. ’It is so humiliating to have stores 
in our country where our own money is not valid,’ fumed a white 
collar worker. 'Not only is the money not good, but people 
without rmission to shop there are turned away by door
with their status. All top government and Party institutions have their 
own buffets with high quality food and take-out service. Luxurious, 
noncrowded holiday resorts are available to members of upper elite 
members of upper elite organizations for free or low prices. Special 
medical care, known as the Fourth Directory of the Ministry, accompanies 
this elite status, while state-approved purchasable •medical services are 
available to these people at a price. Housing for elites includes 
rented or owned dachas, such special superior apartment complexes as 
those run by the Central Committee and KGB, or owned apartments in 
housing cooperatives. The higher the position, the easier it is to 
obtain decent housing. Top officials such as Brezhnev and Kosygin 
maintain, at least, an apartment in Moscow and a dacha in the country­
side. Other advantages enjoyed include private chauffeur-driven 
limousines for the top elite, a special ticket office for all cultural 
events in Moscow, and access to foreign goods from friends traveling
guards.
Soviet political elite enjoy other privileges directly connected
36Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 28.
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37abroad, A superior style of living results from ail these benefits
for the Soviet elite. Though their distribution among the strata of
the elite varies, it is safe to presume that these benefits increase
income ratings of this elite type occupations by perhaps a factor of
38fifty to one hundred percent.
Those who form the top Soviet political elite live an incredibly
39different life than the average Soviet citizen. In Russia, they are
called the nachalstvo, an untranslatable word, whose literal meaning is
4-0"the authorities", but whose true sense is more "the big cheeses."
An example of their separate way of life is illustrated through the
following:
y A Russian workingman, as he watched a long, handmade Zil 
limosine roar down the reserved center land of Kutuzovski 
Prospect in Moscow, preceded by a yellow police car, com­
mented, ’The nachalstvo never sees how the rest of us live.
They go from home to office and home again, escorted all 
i the way. They never go out shopping, stuff is brought to 
them. They don’t even go to the barber, the barber comes 
to them and gives them all kinds of special services.
Their wives don’t do the cooking, their maids do. They 
are always under control, I mean surrounded by police, 
escorted here and there. No, they don't see what you and 
I see. They never wait in line. What kind of life is 
that?'^
■zn
Oleg Penkovshiy, op. cit., pp. 188-191* He cites, "When some 
goes abroad, everyone wants him to buy some presents or just some things 
a person needs which are impossible to get in Moscow . . . .  Prior to 
my next regular trip to London . . .  Mrs. Serov gave me a long list of 
things to buy in Paris and her husband asked me to buy him a lightweight 
tennis jacket . . . ." (This was only in his elite circles.)
38Mervyn Matthews, op. cit., p. 25*
39Robert G. Kaiser, op. cit., p. 173• 
1.
4l.
40Ibid.
'Ibid., p. 176.
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The leaders apparently attempt to appear like everyone else, without
class and occupational distinctions, but their privileges keep them
from it. Their families are secluded from publicity, and the absence
of knowledge about them tends to make them seem unlike other Soviet 
42citizens. This separation is more evident in the attitudes of their
children as described by Oleg Penkovskiy, "Their children despise 
everything Soviet, watch only foreign movie films, and look down on
4^ordinary people."  ^ The life of luxury has its benefits, favortism, 
isolation, and obscurity.
In Chapter III, an often found characteristic of the Soviet 
political elite was expressed, that of hypocrisy. Though this elite 
should represent the epitome of the ''New. Soviet Man', they live a life 
of luxury. Though they profess sincere dedication to the tenets of 
Marxist-Leninisrn, believing in honest and integrity, they lie, deceive, 
scheme against each other, inform on each other, and 'cut each others
44throats.' Though they express contempt for capitalism and self-
gratification, in their pursuit of more money and advancement for them­
selves, they become informants for the KGB on their friends and fellow
4sworkers. Oleg Penkovskiy describes their life in this way,
Our Communism, which we now have been building for almost 
forty-five years is a fraud. I myself am p'art of this fraud; 
after all, I have been one of the privileges . . .  I praise 
our leaders, but inside me I wish them death . . .  I feel 
contempt for myself because I am part of this system and I 
live a lie. °
42Kenneth Ciboski, "Recruitment of the Soviet Politburo" (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Washington, 1971)? P- 112.
43Oleg Penkovskiy, op. cit., p. 55*
44Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 56.
^Ibid.
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Others express this same thought. In his book The Russians, Hedrick 
Smith writes,
With a kind of deliberate schizophrenia, they divide their 
existence into their public lives and their private lives, 
distinguishing between ’official1 relationships and personal 
relationships . . . .  So they adopt two very different 
codes of behavior . . .  ’Our public ljjLfe is living a lie,’ 
commented an elite physicist . . . •*
A young apparatchik once said to an American at a party,
’. . . But what I say and what I am thinking when I am saying 
it are two different things.
Soviet propaganda supports a life of lying. It says, ’We have every­
thing in the Soviet Union and everything we have is better than the
West’, yet, the upper elite acquire many Western goods in preference 
49
tOiSoviet goods. Another slogan professes, 'In our Soviet socialist
society, everything is available, everything is the best’, yet, even
SOsocks and underwear are difficult to obtain.' Even the fevered leader
Leonid Brezhnev does not escape this lie. Though regarded as the
’perfect’ Party man, he is one who loves the good life, expensive
clothes, fast and ostentatious cars, thoroughbred horses, lodge seats
qi
at Moscow’s Dyamo and .Lenin Stadiums, and yachting on the Black Sea."" 
There are members of the Soviet political elite who sincerely believe 
in the greatness of Communism and all its tenets. However, there are 
also many who will do anything to maintain or improve their present 
status, even to living a lie.
47
Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 105.
AS
Ibid., p. 298.
A9Oleg Penkovskiy, op. cit., p. 191.
5°Ibid.
51John Dornberg, op. cit., p. 18.
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Two other factors, possibly a result of the Soviet elite system
seem widespread in the Soviet political system. These are mistrust and
corruption. The first seems to not only be a characteristic of the
citizens* feelings toward their leaders and each other, but also, vice
versa, while corruption remains an inescapable fact of daily life
throughout the Soviet Union in the lives of both the elite and the 
52masses. With the Communist dogma the ever present ideological back­
ground upon which the entire Soviet state is built, the political elite, 
whether sincerely believing in its principles or not, must alv/ays pro­
fess profound devotion to the Communist way of life and the Marxist- 
Leninist doctrine. This constant declaration is a necessity, for one 
never is sure of his position or who may be listening in. Several 
examples explain this phenomenon:
’Human relations are a deadly serious business here,* a 
member of the elite establishment once commented, *We 
resent it if a foreigner comes to a party and brings along 
Russian friends. It ruins the evening for us because it 
takes us a long time to know someone and come to trust them.’
’You can’t trust anyone but your pillow.* One young man 
cursed bitterly, after learning that one of his long-time 
friends had informed on him to the KGB.
’Another member of the elite once commented, ’You know, we 
have lived next door to another couple all our lives 
practically. I have known the wife since childhood and yet,
I have never told her the honest truth . . . .  They are 
different people from us.*53
Leona Schecter, an American, describes her and her family’s reaction to 
this characteristic of mistrust in Soviet society, after they decided to 
leave Moscow, permanently, after two years of living there. (Their 
lives touched both the elite of the society and the masses.)
52"Bribery, Embezzlement, A Way of Life In Russia”, Daily Press, 
by Craig R. Whitney, Sunday, May 7i 1978, p. Al8 .
53Hedrick Smith, op. cit., pp. 109-110.
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By the time we left Moscow, we felt we had lost our innocence.
We made friends with people we didn't trust, distrusted our 
real friends at time . . . .  The Soviet Union had little to 
teach us in the positive sense. After almost two years, we 
felt we had emotionally been to the end of the world . . . .
The children acquired a veneer . . .  reticent to speak freely 
and openly with people we didn't know well. They were careful 
and guarded, secretive about mentioning a friend’s name v/hen 
repeating some bit of information he had given us. Trust 
because reserved, finally, only for the family.5^
The Soviet society is also one in which the leaders mistrust 
55the citizens. They lack complete confidence m  their mandate to rule
so they contrive magnanimous demonstrations of loyalty to lay their
doubts to rest. In Russia, this is called ’pokazuka’ which, though
having no English translation, comes from the verb to show off; the
slang noun means, roughly, something one does for the sake of doing it,
for show; by definition, the act involved is one of no material conse-
56quences, but it looks good. Further evidence of this mistrust is that
public voting is always reported as unanimous and speeches on public
57occasions alv/ays praise the leaders and society's accomplishments.
Within the Soviet society, trust- is an ideal to be hoped for, honesty
nearly as unknown, friendships fragile, and secretism a way of life.
*
Corruption is another disease that is rampant in Soviet society, 
reaching high into the elite Party and government ranks. It appears in 
various forms. Bribery is one of the most prevalent. Lenin called
Corruption is the behavior of public officials which deviates 
from the accepted norms, in order to serve private needs.
5*f
Leona and Jerrold Schecter, An American Family in Moscow 
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1975)» PP* *f00-^ 01. "
55Robert G. Kaiser, op. cit., p. 159*
^Ibid., p. 1 6 0.
57Ibid., p. 159.
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bribery * the -worst- enemy of the revolution1, whereas almost fifty years
later, Nikita Khrushchev tried to stamp it out, 'this disgraceful
survival of the past* by ordering the death penalty for serious 
58bribery. Leonid Brezhnev has continued his predecessors* attack by
calling for a continued struggle against such vestiges of the past as
59* money-grubbing, bribery, etc.* A typical example of this is paying 
off an official in order to have an off-spring accepted into a pre­
ferred institute of learning or receive a sought-after position. Other 
examples involving bribery are selling off state resources, granting 
apartment permits, receiving diplomas without earning- them (refer to 
Chapter III) and allotting plots of land for dachas as payoffs.^ At 
the high levels of society, it is not necessary to pay off grocery 
clerks for special merchandise or a foreign friend for currency coupons 
for the upper elite have their own special stores. But, "that's cor­
ruption in itself", a resentful young Party member has said, "it's why
the leadership doesn't talk much about corruption anymore . . . .
6lThey're silent because they're all involved." The leaders and the 
press do call for reform, but this is often ignored, due to the involve­
ment, at high levels, of officials.
Embezzlement is another form of corruption prevalent in Soviet 
society. Millions of dollars are known to have been taken from state 
enterprises. The most celebrated case related to this was of Yekaterina
58Craig R. Whitney, op. cit., p. Al8 .
59Steven J. Staats, "Corruption in the Soviet System", Problems 
of Communism (January-February, 1972), p. 43.
60x,Ibid.
^Craig R. Whitney, op. cit., p. Al8.
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Furtseva, the Minister of Culture and a favorite of Khrushchev’s, In
the spring of 197 +^> it surfaced that she had built a dacha in the
country worth about $lb5»00Q with state-owned materials obtained 
62through fraud. The scandal included the fact that she was building 
it openly in her daughter's name which constitutes passing on the
6^perquisites of power to the next generation, forbidden by Soviet law. "
She was required to pay the state about $80,000 for the dacha (an
amount which she was able to produce in only a. few days) and lost her
seat in the Supreme Soviet. Yet, she retained her position as Minister
of Culture until she died, later that year. Another example is the
case of Vasily Mzhavanadze, a candidate member of the Politburo. As
previously mentioned, he was 'retired' from his position due to his
connections with one Otari Lasishvili who had built up a network of
underground private enterprises together with other businessmen.
Lazishvili had, as reported, swindled the state out of over 1.7 million
64rubles in funds and goods. Reportedly, he was able to do this be­
cause he was in partnership with Mrs. Vasily Mzhavanadze while her 
husband sat on the Politburo. As previously stated, the year 1972 
brought an end to this scandal.
Another form of corruption involving high officials is referred 
to as 'blat't the use of personal influence to obtain favors to which a
certain department, enterprise, or official is not legally or formally 
63entitled. ' The upper political elite become involved when enterprises
62Ibid. 
63.Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 100.
64°^Ibid., p. 9 7 -
65Steven J. Staats, op. cit., p. 42.
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under their control cannot fulfill a quota or lack necessary inventory.
In many cases, if this occurs, the chairman or manager is urged by the
controlling official to use the parallel market, that market of goods
and services which functions outside the system of institutionalized
66economic relationships, beyond government controls. The ironical
thing about this form of corruption is that in certain circumstances,
on a limited scale, it makes an important contribution to organizational
efficiency and goal fulfillment.
Other forms of corruption, on a more personal scale, thrive.
Oleg Penkovskiy wrote,
The sons, daughters, and son-in-laws of all important Party 
and government officials finish higher educational institu­
tions and get good jobs . . .  everything is done by pull, 
through friends and family connections. Though the news­
papers scream that nepotism must be stamped out, they only 
punish some factory director for giving a job to his niece.
Khrushchev's son-in-law was the chief editor of the newspaper Izvestiya
during his father-in-law's reign. He often wrote on Communist morality,
yet in private life, had to be; reprimanded by Khrushchev to be more
careful about his 'adventures'. He also was known to put his name to
68someone else's work, winning the Lenin Prize once when he did this.
As in other political systems, instances of moral corruption or 'fixing 
of the law' occur among the political elite, but these are minor com­
pared to the other forms of corruption prevalent in the society.
66Dimitri K. Siraes, "The Parallel Market", Survey, Autumn, 
197^, p. 51.
Cj?
Oleg Penkovskiy, op. cit., pp. 211-212.
68tk.,Ibid.
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It has been suggested that one of the reasons that corruption
continues to thrive in the Soviet Union is because it allows, in the
masses, the feeling that they are able to manipulate and influence the
system in which they live, therefore, making it more tolerable. It
also leads to consolidation and unity of the two parallel hierarchies
through patronage and nepotism, forcing them to work together to cut
corners, break laws and regulations, defraud higher supervisory organi-
69zations, and engage in other illegal practices to fulfill goals. It 
also allows the elites to preserve their place in society. 'There is 
little hope that corruption will be eradicated from the Soviet society 
for it performs too many important functions.
Summary
The Soviet political elite do not epitomize the ’New Soviet Man.* 
They possess.all the desires, attributes, and shortcomings of any human 
being. They prefer a life with materialistic rewards rather than ideo­
logical goals. The society in which they live fosters the use of 
patronage in achieving personal and public success, making it the major 
factor in political mobility. Political tactics, maneuvers, and techni­
ques are used extensively, especially in furthering careers. A superior 
social and materialistic status are enjoyed by members of this group 
with even a weakness for corruption being present. The Soviet politi­
cal elite pose a strong resemblance to their counterparts in other 
countries. They seem to be approaching the mode of capitalistic politi­
cians rather than that of the ’New Soviet Man.*
69 1^Steven J. Staats, op. cit., p. A7 .
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
A picture of the All Union Soviet political elite has been
developed through the material presented in this thesis. They are a
select group of middle-aged men, educated, with white collar positions
in Soviet society. Though the theoretical ideal of the lowly worker or
peasant achieving political heights is still professed, this analysis
has shown that this myth appears only to be a reality in the Politburo,
whose members have jealously guarded their generational control for
years. In the other bodies, occupational representation clearly shows
*
the dominance of white collar representation, with most members holding 
professional positions in the state or Party heirarchy. Whatever the 
social origin or occupational representation, members of the All Union 
organizations covered are currently considered part of the elite stratum 
of Soviet society, with benefits and pay that distinguish them from the 
average Soviet citizen. The age factor in the description shows the 
dominance of the older generation in all the All Union political bodies. 
With the recruitment practices of Soviet politics, there seems to be 
little chance that this trend will change in the near future.
The majority of the political elite is of Slavic nationality 
with Russian predominating. However, to guard against an outbreak of
*
Social class origins may, like the Politburo, be mostly from 
the lower classes as the sample for the Council of Ministers indicates. 
However, data in the area for the Supreme Soviet, Party Congress, and 
Central Committee was not available.
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localism plus appear to be following Marx's tenet of mass participation 
in the government, the Supreme Soviet, as the state's representative 
assembly, has an overrepresentation of the minorities "rather than the 
Slavs. This also gives the regime better access to the feelings and 
reactions of all the population.
The use of political tactics is vital to the career of Soviet 
politicians. One wrong decision could destroy what it has taken a 
lifetime to achieve. Seeking the services of a more prominent indi­
vidual whom the political elite pledge to support for purposes of 
advancing their own careers is a practice fervently followed in Soviet 
politics, while the existence of corruption in political circles is 
widespread. The All Union Soviet political elite is a unique group of 
people, whose study uncovers many revealing aspects of the Soviet 
political system.
Major Hypotheses
Of the major hypotheses offered in Chapter I, the investigations 
carried out through this research resulted in the support of three and 
the rejection of one. In order to treat each hypothesis with clarity 
and understanding, methodology similar to that used in the Objective 
and Hypotheses section of Chapter I will be followed.
1. The Soviet political elite is a middle-aged group of 
conservative men.
The evidence gathered in this research on the whole 
supported this hypothesis. Middle age, forty years or older, 
dominates the memberships of the political bodies discussed 
in this thesis. Whereas the Supreme Soviet and Party
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Congress were found to have 50 to 70 percent of their 
memberships over the age of forty, the Central Committee, 
reflecting the Council of Ministers' membership as well as 
its Presidium, and the Politburo, were shown to have 90 to 
100 percent of their membership over the age of forty.
This group has dominated these memberships since the sixties 
and there is little evidence that this trend is changing.
With Brezhnev's rise to power in 19^^, the entire 
character of the Soviet political system changed. Rather 
than launching in to sudden schemes or innovations, charac­
teristic of Khrushchev's reign, conservatism and maintaining 
the status quo came to predominate in Soviet politics.
Older age of members and low turnover rates, for the most 
part, in recent years in the All Union political bodies, 
seem to project this trend. Robert Wesson specifically 
describes this conservatism in Soviet politics by saying,
In recent years, the Soviet political scene has 
generally been monotonously placid, with hardly 
any signs of the kind of controversy that bub­
bled up during the reign of the ebullient 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev.^
The personality and style of Leonid Brezhnev seems to have
had the most effect on this new trend (refer to Chapter V).
John Domberg describes Brezhnev as ". . . a  conservative . . .
who takes few chances . . .  does not implement wild schemes
^Robert Wesson, "Brezhnev's Year", Current History (October,
1977), p. 109..
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to solve problems . . .  who does not like to rock the boat
2or have others rock it."
The fact that the political elite of the Soviet 
Union consists mostly of men hints at the 'unwritten1 des- 
crimination of women in political circles. Though the two 
lower political elite bodies, the Supreme Soviet and the 
Party Congress, show up to 23 percent women representation, 
since the death of Yekaterina Furtseva in 197^, no woman has 
held All Union ministerial or Politburo membership. Sta­
tistics are unavailable for their representation in the 
Central Committee but no source consulted hinted at it in 
this body. Though the political elites at all levels of 
the government and Party heirarchies were not investigated, 
for those of the memberships researched, the first hypothe­
sis seems valid.
2. Successful careers of the Soviet political elite are related 
to educational level, nationality group, age and occupational 
sta. bus.
Successful careers can be defined in two different 
ways. One deals with contentment in career choice while the 
other concerns advancement and enhancement of status. If 
the former definition is used, though this research does not 
claim to have covered this subject in that trend, the 
hypothesis would have to be rejected due to the often
p
John Dornberg, Brezhnev (New York: Basic Books, 197^), p« 33«
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existing conflict between the public and private lives of 
the Soviet political elite, the paranoia that someone is 
always watching or listening, the must of pleasing often 
ill-qualified superiors, and the necessity of carrying out 
undesirable orders. From these characteristics of Soviet 
political careers, career frustration could develop regard­
less of educational level, nationality group, age, or occu­
pational status.
On the other hand, if the definition of enhancement 
or advancement of status is used, then, the hypothesis was 
supported through the evidence presented in this paper. In. 
each political organization, the educational level of the 
memberships was either very high or showing an increasing 
trend. Percentages for those with college or institute 
educations for the most recent years of the individual data 
ranged from ^8 percent for the Supreme Soviet deputies to 
over 8 7 percent for Politburo members while members with 
only an elementary education ranged from 0 percent for 
Politburo members to 20 percent for Supreme Soviet deputies. 
The evidence seemed to support the assertions that educa­
tional level among the All Union political elite was rising 
and the higher the position desired, the higher the level 
ones education needed to be.
While the Russian nationality predominated in all 
the organizations studied, ranging from kj> percent to 6A 
percent of the total memberships, compared to the nearest
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population census, it was overrepresented in all cases 
except the Supreme Soviet. The situation for a combined 
Slavic representation was similar. With the percentages 
ranging from 59 percent to 8? percent, this group con­
trolled each organization, even the Supreme Soviet. But, 
again, in the Supreme Soviet, the group was underrepre­
sented. The regime needs one organization where the 
minorities seem to be fully represented in order to give 
those citizens as well as the leaders a feeling of support 
for each other. Also, in Soviet politics, it is those of 
Slavic nationality, especially Russian, who achieve higher 
political position.
As previously mentioned, middle age or over forty 
years is the most dominant age for the lower political 
elite; over fifty for the upper elite; and over fifty-seven 
for the top political elite. The youth in the Party or 
government heirarchy stand little opportunity at elite posi­
tions until they have reached these age plateaus. With the 
older generation continually protecting its control, as 
related in the material, opportunity for a movement of youth 
into influential positions does not seem to be open. The 
older the political elite, the more the opportunity there is 
to become a member of the upper or top bodies of the govern­
ment or Party heirarchies.
Occupationally, the majority of the All Union politi­
cal elite hold white collar, if not professional, positions. 
Worker and peasant representation is only substantial in the
13^
two lowest political elite bodies, the Supreme Soviet and 
the Party Congress. As mentioned in Chapter II, those 
figures might even be misleading. With the preference for 
the white collar background in the memberships, representa­
tion from the worker or peasant classes have less opportunity 
for participation in the Soviet political process. This 
research supports the second hypothesis. The best qualifi­
cations for a successful career in Soviet politics is being 
of middle or older age, having institute or college training, 
being Slavic or especially Russian, and holding a white collar 
position in the state or Party heirarchies.
3* The Soviet political elite epitomizes the MNew Soviet Man”.
The evidence contained in this thesis rejects this 
hypothesis. Either the Communist theoreticians were naive 
to think human nature could be so molded to eliminate sel­
fishness and desire from a person’s makeup or the Soviet 
society has not yet reached the stage at which this re­
vamping of human nature can take place.^ The Soviet 
politicians were found to be motivated by self-interest, 
ambition, and achievement of material success rather than 
a great dedication to Communist ideology. They will use 
manipulative tactics to reach these goals, patronage to 
obtain purposeful friendships, and corruption, if needed, 
to secure success. This group relishes the privileged life
3
Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, Soviet Institutions The 
Individual and Society (Boston, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing
House, 1 9 6 7)~ p . 6l8.
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that accompanies their status in Soviet society and does not
appear to be willing to put ideology or goals of the state
above personal comfort. In the West, Leonid Brezhnev and
Alexis Kosygin are often regarded as examples of the 'New
Soviet Man*. This assumption is grossly misguided. Both
men, like other members of the elite, especially upper elite,
are protective of their status and privilege, even proud of
them. Muscovites find this entire situation, especially the
life style, such a mockery of Marxist ideals that they make
k
fun of it with a joke on Brezhnev.
Brezhnev wanted to impress his mother on how well 
he had done in his career. He decided to invite 
her up from their home in Dneprodzerzhinsk, in the 
Ukraine and show her his ample in-town apartment, 
but she was nonplussed, even a little ill-at-ease.
So he called the Kremlin, ordered his Zil, and 
they sped out to his dacha near Usovo, one used 
previously by Stalin and Khrushchev. He took her 
all around, showed her each room, showed her the 
handsome grounds, but still she said nothing. So 
he called for his personal helicopter and flew her 
straight to his hunting lodge at Zavidovo. There, 
he escorted her to the banquet room, grandly dis­
playing the big fireplace, his guns, the whole bit 
and, unable to restrain himself any longer, asked 
her pleadingly, 'Tell me Mama, what do you think?'
'Well,' she hesitated, 'It's good Leonid. But 
what if the Reds come back?'^
With the life of these elites being so divorced from 
that of the average citizen, the stage of social consciousness
Zil is the name for a Russian-made limousine.
Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle/The New
York Times Book Co., 197&), p- 38-
^Ibid.
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which must be achieved to mold the 'New Soviet Man1 seems 
not yet to have been reached.
Karel and Irene Hulicka speak of this topic in the
following words:
Ever since the Party has been in power, it has 
been working on the problem of modifying the 
behavior and attitudes of people to conform with 
the type of society which it has attempted to 
build . . . .  Its goal is two-fold and circular, 
to perfect social organizations so that the 
members of society may be perfected gradually 
and at the same time to transform people into 
higher social beings who will participate 
actively in the process of perfecting 
society . . . .  Although the party has had 
partial success in preparing some of the pre­
requisites for changes which it desires, there 
is no tangible evidence to support the hypothesis 
that it will be able to mold human nature in 
accordance with its goals . . .
The 'New Soviet Man' has not appeared yet in Soviet
society. The evidence in this paper strongly suggests he
won't, but science indicates that one is seldom justified in
drawing conclusions about the results of an experiment before 
7
it is concluded.
4. The Soviet political elite constitute an upper class in Soviet 
society.
The support or rejection of this hypothesis depends
8upon the definition which is attached to the word class. For
^Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, op. cit., pp. 6l8-62^.
*^Ibid., p. 62*f.
g
Eugeni Ivanov, the Secretary for Far Eastern Political Affairs 
at the Soviet Embassy in 1976 told this author that 'class refers to 
land ownership' and since all land is owned by the state, then there are 
no classes in the Soviet Union. However, as will be discussed, the 
holding of private property exists in the Soviet Union. If that means 
actual land, the sources were unclear on that point.
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the purposes of this discussion, class will be defined in 
the manner set out in Chapter I for social class. Using 
that definition, this research has supported this hypothesis. 
Hedrick Smith describes Soviet thoughts on the social struc­
ture in Soviet society. "Officially in the Soviet Union,
there are two equal classes, the workers and the peasants and
9
a 'stratum* of employees." It is the 'stratum' that consti­
tutes the elite group of Soviet society of which the political 
elite is the group with powder. That group has developed into 
such an upper class, that the description of Soviet society as 
'classless' also seems almost a mockery of the teachings of 
Marx. The Soviet system has institutionalized a double 
standard in life styles— for the elite especially political 
elite and for the masses— ; these elite take their advantages 
for granted with an arrogant distain for the common man that 
often surpasses the haughtiest rich in the West.^
Chapter V of this thesis describes all the privileges 
and benefits accorded to this upper class, rising in amount 
with the importance of ones position in the state or Party 
hierarchy. At the very top, the great amount of privileges 
insulates that group from all the harassments and discom­
forts of an ordinary citizen.'*''1" Chapter II gives further 
evidence that the state supports this distinction by
^Hedrick Smith, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
^Ibid., p. -^3*
^■Robert Kaiser, Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1976), p. 177*
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offering attractive inducements to Supreme Soviet deputies, 
while Chapter III illustrates the link between social origin 
and/or occupational representation and political elite 
careers in the Soviet political system.
The system of privilege among the political elites
has been so entrenched in Soviet society that dissidents have
taken to speak out against it. Roy Medevev, one such spoke-
man, advocates a toning down of this practice.
. . .  It is in the interest of socialist society 
that its leaders have everything they need, since 
prosperity and well being of the whole people 
depend upon the quality of their work. They are 
in fact representatives of the nation and this 
function also requires additional expense . . . .
An individual's talent is not just his own per­
sonal possession but also belongs to the whole 
people— society must nourish it with the care and 
attention it deserves. There is the danger how­
ever that this whole system of special privilege- 
can become self-serving and change from a means 
to an end. And it is often the case that privi­
leges tend to multiply out of proportion . . .  
when privileges are granted from above in the 
absence of public supervision, it is much easier 
for them to become excessive, leading to secret 
perogatives and the abuse of high office.^
This research concludes that the Soviet Sfnion is not 
a 'classless' society. Its political elite is an upper class. 
The life-style of top Soviet government and Party officials 
with their foreign travel, ample expense allowances, imported 
clothes, dachas and servants, access to special shopping is 
as far beyond the ken of a Russian steel worker or a milk­
maid on a collective farm as the life style of the jet set
Ttoy A. Medevev, On Socialist Democracy (New York: Alfred
Knopf, 1975), p. 227.
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American is from the life of a Detroit auto worker or a
13migrant farm laborer in California* A Soviet citizen who 
is aware of the life of the political elite and desires it 
can only secure it through official status in the govern­
ment or Party, No amount of money can buy this way of life.
As a senior state official and Party member told writer Robert 
Kaiser, "We are attracting good young people into the Party 
and government apparatus, not for idealistic reasons, but for 
practical reasons."^
To balance this discussion, arguments often used by 
Soviets, including Marxist minded dissidents, to disclaim 
that Soviet society has given birth to a new class will be 
mentioned. First, while the children of successful people 
tend to inherit part of their parents* status, generally it
15is not possible to pass on great wealth or political power.
Second, whereas one day an official may enjoy the respect of
his colleagues and all the comforts that the state can extend
to him, the next day this could all be taken away, for if one
l6loses his position, he loses everything. However, reality 
somewhat changes the facts in these arguments. The power 
elite, by placing children or relatives in prestigious insti­
tutes, as long as they are not demoted, really do provide for
13Hedrick Smith, op. cit,, p. 51«
1 if
Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 192.
15Ibid., p. l8l. 
l6Hedrick Smith, op. cit., pp. ^9-50.
long term status for the next family generation. (Successful 
intelligensia are able to pass on private wealth.) As 
illustrated, both in the Chapters and this conclusion, any 
attempt to transform Soviet society into the Marxist of 
fclassless' has yet to succeed.
Robert Kaiser adds an annodote to his discussion on
privilege in Russia in his book Russia which not only suggest
the real, reason why Nikita Khrushchev was ousted, but also,
hints at the feelings of the populace toward those of the
privileged class in their society.
Khrushchev had the reputation, especially among 
intellectuals in Moscow, of being a relatively 
austere man, less interested in the privileges 
of power than many of his colleagues. One rumor 
which spread through the capital a few years ago 
(in the late sixties and early seventies) was 
that Brezhnev, Kosygin and the others moved 
against Khrushchev in 196^ when they learned he
planned to do away with many of their privileges.
I never learned where this story originated and 
it may be baseless, but it does indicate the 
sort of thing many Muscovites are prepared to 
believe about their leaders (in regards to the 
privileged life).*!?
Minor Hypotheses
The statistical and narrative material was presented in this 
thesis in order to investigate the major hypotheses set forth in
Chapter I. However, in the course of their investigation, several minor
hypotheses could not help but have been investigated due to their related
subject material. It is the discussion of these that this conclusion 
covers now.
*
Though the basis of this rumor is unknown, it v/as Khrushchev who 
forced the top elite to move out of the Kremlin and live closer to the 
common people.
17Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 188.
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!• The Soviet government elite is powerless in Soviet politics.
Though this hypothesis is not totally rejected, the 
evidence gathered indicated that this may not always he the 
case. The Soviet government elite do display some power in 
the political system; the dilemma is how much?
Chapter II brought out that though bills or resolu­
tions are not usually initiated by deputies of the Supreme 
Soviet, the deputies can enter into the discussion of them 
in the Commissions or sub-Coramissions and have some influence 
in the final form of a bill. Also, they do act as ombudsmen 
for their constituents. In Chapter III, the status and high 
regard of the Council of Ministers members as with its 
Presidium members (in Chapter IV) hints at the possession of 
political power, but to what degree? Also v/hereas most of 
the bills of the Council which are sent to the Supreme Soviet 
are initiated by Party directives, the overlapping membership 
betv/een the Central Committee, its Secretariat, and/or
v
Politburo and the Council of Ministers brings up the question 
of who initiates what and when! (However, evidence is un­
available to answer that.) Since one wrong move may mean a 
career in Soviet politics, the longevity in office of these 
ministers speaks by itself of the possession of some form of 
power, either personal, public, or both.
The status of government officials is also increasing 
in the Soviet political system. With the increase of their 
membership in the Central Committee and Politburo, this seems 
as a legitimizing effect of the power of the Soviet government
and of its importance to the party to control. With Leonid 
Brezhnev now a government official and the status of Alexis 
Kosygin, the entire government apparatus seems to be taking 
on the appearance of a power center. The fact that state 
officials are beginning to have larger representation in 
elite Party bodies and are able to hold on to their posi­
tions for a rather long period of time plus being accepted 
as members of the upper political elite implies that govern- 
officials in the Soviet political system are not powerless. 
All Union political institutions, except the Politburo, have 
only * rubber stamp* power.
The case of this hypothesis is unique. The evidence 
gathered showed that in some cases this hypothesis was sup­
ported while in others it was rejected. The unmentioned 
power behind all the All Union political institutions is the 
upper Party elite or Politburo members. The fact that they 
hold membership in nearly every body discussed causes this 
hypothesis to be supported. Since major decisions of either 
government, economic, or Party nature have already been dis­
cussed and decided upon by them, the passage of these deci­
sions in the form of resolutions or bills in either hierarchy 
is only a formal process to be carried out. Even the Council 
of Ministers, though not fitting the assembly image, usually 
only draws up bills or resolutions after Party directives 
have been received.
On the other hand, these institutions can contribute 
to these decisions and in some cases even make them. Supreme
Soviet deputies are allowed to discuss matters in committees*
The Party Congress does allow various members to speak in.
front of a full sitting, along with the top Party officials.
As mentioned, the longevity and professionalism of the Council
of Ministers emanates some form of power and possible program
initiation. The Presidiumsmay have the least amount of actual
domination, but by their existence, display some control over
their respective assemblies. The Central Committee is admit-
*
tedly used at times to settle disputes of fate of leaders.
This hypothesis, while generally accepted in the West, has 
been shown to not always be the case in Soviet politics.
3, Political behavior as it appears in the Soviet Union demon­
strates the desire of the political elite for power and status 
in Soviet society.
Acceptance was the outcome of the investigation con­
cerning this hypothesis in this paper. Chapter V presents 
the evidence in detail that supports it. Covert maneuvering,
j
accepted methodology, stiff competition, and jealously are 
part of the political life of the Soviet political elite in 
order to attain power. Double standards, a complete separa­
tion of private and public lives, and a profession (though 
possibly not belief) of dedication to Communist ideals is the 
common pattern followed in order to attain political status. 
The Soviet political elites are ambitious, power-hungry, and
This refers to the case of Nikita Khrushchev in 1957 and the case 
of Georgi Malenko earlier, in 1955-
lMf
status seekers with the goal of upward political mobility 
dominating their lives.
Patronage is the overriding factor in political mobility in 
the Soviet political system.
Support for this hypothesis was found throughout this 
thesis. In an oligarchical, totalitarian state such as the 
Soviet Union, connections or friends are very important in 
order to maintain or advance ones status. When power is as 
precarious as discussed under Major Hypotheses No. 4, those 
involved place great importance upon gaining supporters both 
superior and inferior to them in order to have some form of 
job security.
In Soviet elections, having a patron-client relation­
ship with the proper level of Party elite could enhance ones 
opportunity for candidature for a desired position, while the 
nomeklatura system operates like a self-perpetuating, self-
selecting fraternity, a closed corporation with the Party
(
18bosses at all levels making the important decisions. Patron­
age can play a large role in those decisions. In top elite 
positions, while packing the Party and state bodies with 
members of their own factions and demoting those who were not
entirely dependent upon them, first Stalin and then Khrushchev
1^was able to rise to a position of all encompassing power. '
18.Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 105-
3
Philip Stewart and others, MPoli 
Process", American Political Science Review (December, 1972), p. 1270.
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Brezhnev, too, in recent years, using the same method, has 
enhanced his power and presently is recognized as the leader 
of the Soviet Union, both inside and outside the country.
In a study entitled "Political Mobility-Soviet Politi­
cal Process”, the authors found that the significance of 
patronage on political mobility was higher during the periods 
of "unchallengeable” power of Stalin and Khrushchev than during 
the Brezhnev-Kosygin era. Due to the latter findings, they 
state that the significance of patronage on political mobility
in Soviet politics is probably overestimated (they see per-
20
formance as significant if not more so). However, their 
data only covered the Brezhnev-Kosygin era for three years,
196^-67* During that period, as discussed in Chapter IV, 
Brezhnev did not begin to display his influence or make full 
use of the patronage system. It was not until the early 
seventies that being assured of his power, he began to bring 
supporters into the Politburo and other memberships. There­
fore, this research contradicts the conclusions of the above 
article, offering the summation that while performance does 
have a significance on political mobility, patronage is the 
overriding factor in it in the Soviet political system.
5. Ideological orientation is the guiding force in the life of
the Soviet political elite.
As the discussions of Major Hypotheses 3 and relate, 
the results of the investigation and subsequent evidence in
20Ibid., pp. 1279-12.8 .^
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the paper shows that the guiding force in the life of the 
political elite appears to be material success rather than 
ideological orientation. V/ith the prevalence of leading a 
double life for most political elites in that official duties 
or policy often conflicts with personal beliefs and with the 
great emphasis placed on personal comfort, that dedicated, 
ideological person does not seem to exist within this group. 
Rather than distribute wealth and privileges among the people, 
as would go along with Marxist idealism, Chapter V related how 
those in the privileged class guard their benefits jealously, 
similar to those of the older generation who intensely guard 
their positions of power from the intrusion of the young.
If an ideological orientation is to be the motivating
force in the lives of the Soviet political elite, it would be
a rationalization on the progress of Soviet society toward
communism, dominated by a fervent display of patriotism for
the Motherland. To the Soviet citizen as well as the elite,
the Motherland is an endearing part of their lives; they
21think.their country is 'something special'. This usually 
does not reflect the Communist ideology of the Party programs, 
but the love of Russia herself. If a force beyond material 
success drives a member of the All Union political elite, it 
probably is more a love and respect for Russia than for the 
totalitarian country of the Soviet Union.
23.Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 190.
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Summation
The All Union Soviet political elite shows a surprising amount of 
ability, educationally, professionally, and politically. Their actions 
may reflect Communist ideological goals, but more often, personal career 
ambitions. Though they may privately question their system of government, 
publically, they vocally support it. The intricacies, idiosyncrasies, and 
conflicts of Soviet politics has forced these politicians to function in 
a system where mistrust and unknowing are facts of life, non-success in an 
assignment could end a career, and personal dignity is a virtue unknown.
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APPENDIX A
PARALLELISM OF HXERASCfilES 
ALL UNION LEVEL
State Hierarchy
body.
Council of 
Ministers
5F
Supreme Soviet
Soviet of 
the Union
Soviet of 
Nat ionalit ie s
Party Hierarchy
Presidium of /— Presidium
Council of - A of Supreme Politburo
Ministers r Soviet ]
Central
Committee
Party Congress
•Solid Arrows indicate ivoNtia/xl inferior body to n g m w &I superior 
Broken Arrows indicate actual inferior body to actual superior
SOURCE: Herbert McClosky and John Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship
(New York: McGraw-Hill, i9 6 0), pp. 205, 519- William A. McGenaghan,
Magruder's Government (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1 9 6 7), P* 25-
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APPENDIX C
SLAVIC CORE IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Members Nationality Four Comm. Five Comm.
1971
Elected
Benediktov Russian *
Kosygin Russian * *
Mikhailov Russian *
Patolichev Russian * *
Pegov Russian * *
Pospelov Russian *
Aristov Russian *
Beshchev Russian * *
Brezhnev Russian * *
Chernyshev Russian *
Goryachev Russian * *
Grishin Russian * *
Kapitanov Russian * *
Kuznetsov Russian * *
Ignatov Russian *
Organov Russian *
Puzanov Russian * *
Rumyantsev Russian * *
Shelepin Russian * *
Suslov Russian * *
Titov Russian *
Ustinov Russian * *
Voronov Russian * *
Yasnov Russ5.an * *
Yefremov Russian * *
Voroshilov Russian * *
Konev Ukrainian * *
KoroChenko Ukrainian *
Korneichuk Ukrainian * *
Mikoyan Armenian * *
Snieckus Lithuanian * *
Kalnberzins Latvian *
Kabin Estonian * *
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APPENDIX C - Continued
1971
Members Nationality Four Comm. Five Comm. Elected
Reaching Four Time Committee Members in 1971
Dementyev Russian
Furteseva Russian
Gromyko Russian
Kirilenko Russian
Ponomarev Russian
Sholnikov Russian
Yefremov Russi n
Moskalenko Ukrainian
Podgorny Ukrainian
Polyansky Ukrainian
Titov Ukrainian
Mazurov Belorussian
Dzhavkhishvili Georgian
Mzhavanadze Georgian
Nassr idinova Uzbek
Kunayev Kazakh
SOURCE: Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite11 (unpublished
Ph.d. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), pp. 8 f^, 8 6.
APPENDIX D
LONGEVITY- OF POLITBURO MEMBERSHIP
Name 1964 1967 1971 1973 Beg. 1976 Beg. 1977
L. Brezhnev X X X X X X
A. Kirilenko X X X X X X
A. Kosygin X X X X X X
A. Mikoyan X - - - -
N. Podgorny X X X X X X
D. Poliansky X X X X X -
A. Shelepin X X X X - -
P. Shelest X X X - - -
N. Shvernik X - - - - -
M. Suslov X X X X X X
G. V oronov X X X - - -
K. Mazurov — X X X X X
A. Pelshe — X X X X X
V. Grishin - - X X X X
D. Kunaev - - X X X X
V. She herb i t sky - - X X X X
F. Kulakov - - X X X X
y. Andropov - - - X X X
A. Grechko - - - X X -
A. Gromyko - - - X X X
G. Romanov - - - - — X
D. Ustinov - - - -- - X
Percents Of the 1977 Membership - 33% had 
bT/o had 
73% had 
%7% had 
87^ had
served
served
served
served
served
since
since
since
since
since
1964
1967
1971
1973
1976
SOURCE: Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet
Union", Problems of Communism, March-April, 1975? P- 6 . Richard F.
Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1975? 1976 ,
1977 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1975? 1976, 1977)?
pp. 8l, 69, 96.
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